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Executive Summary  
This critical review contends that accounts of cultural value designed to articulate the 
specific value of culture within contemporary polity and governance cannot but fail to 
achieve their objective.  Trammeled by economistic utilitarianism on the one side and an 
uncritical aestheticism on the other, culture’s articulation is either quantitative or mute. 
This state of affairs has arisen as a result of a set of intellectual reflections on social 
order which can clearly be traced as far back as the fourteenth century, arguably 
achieve their hegemony by the late eighteenth century and have continued to dominate 
thought intio the twenty-first century.  Whilst it has been common to argue that such 
reflections codified the distinctions of economy and aesthetics, or as is often said today 
the instrumental and the instrinsic, this critical review argues that these positions are 
the product of a singular process and that therefore the persistent representation of 
them as antagonists is false.  That process is called abstraction and is the form in which 
the political codification of market society took place over that period.  These categories 
are a product of that process, co-defining each other in mutual exclusion.  This is one 
aspect of abstraction.  There are two others.  In defining the public sphere as one 
governed by market relationships, ethics was disembedded from the social and re-cast 
in a form appropriate to the new form of society – utilitarianism being its clearest 
expression.  In a similar way, human labour was both abstracted by exchange and 
instumentalised as a simple means to an end.  The instrumentalisation of labour 
completed art’s isolation from the routines of social production.  The paper concludes by 
suggesting that the emergence of a set of new cultural economic imaginaries in the last 
twenty years draws the historical limitations of abstraction to critical attention. 
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Introduction: cultural value and the missing tradition 
(i) History, critical theory and the autonomy of the aesthetic 
This critical review offers a perspective on the contemporary British 
concern with cultural value from within a family of theoretical positions 
nominally termed cultural economy.   Insofar as the concern with cultural 
value centres on the desirability, and indeed, the very possibility of 
providing an account of it from within the group of philosophies of art 
distinctively described as aesthetic this review argues that cultural value 
harbours a misconception.  The review’s central argument is that the 
intimations of post-aesthetic (Bernstein 1993) theory, contained in the 
principle critiques of European and North American modernity, in which 
theoretical developments can be argued to point towards the dissolution 
of the foundational eighteenth century categorial distinctions between the 
aesthetic (the beautiful), the ethical (right conduct) and the cognitive 
(reason or truth) are to be detected in the specific conditions of 
contemporary cultural production.  Such conditions, it argues, challenge a 
number of obvious bodies of thought.  They challenge accounts of artistic 
or cultural experience that argue for its autonomy in the manner of 
eighteenth century theory, but which is at the heart of many 
contemporary attempts to distinguish forms of cultural value from their 
economic alternatives (Hutter and Throsby 2011).  It perhaps goes 
without saying that such a challenge also denies attempts to construct an 
account of the efficacy of the aesthetic that seeks to locate it in a critique 
of its moral or cognitive analogues; normative universalism and scientific 
positivism respectively.  It also implicitly critiques, for broadly similar 
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reasons, the various attempts, in cultural studies and sociology for 
example, to overcome categorical separation by positing relations 
between the distinctively defined categories, subject to varying 
qualifications regarding reductivity and their autonomy (relative or 
otherwise). 
 
It is a trope of modernist critical theory that the aesthetic was the product 
of a series of intellectual codifications, initiated and refined between the 
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, which defined capitalist modernity 
in terms of the spheres of culture, economy and society, or to put it 
another way, the aesthetic, the scientific and the ethical (Bowie 1990, 
Eagleton 1990, Crowther 1993).  Typically defined against a metaphysics 
that conflated the good, the beautiful and the true, capitalist modernity is 
alleged to have ushered in an era of enlightened rationality in which 
material reproduction, political order and subjective contemplation 
proceeded according to natural laws.  In theory, art came to be perceived 
as aesthetically distinctive to poesis (labour); performed by especial 
creative capabilities (genius) and subject to its own critical regime 
(judgment or taste).  What is often overlooked in this epochalist reading 
of history is that this categorial separation also installed its own 
epistemological invigilator in the various forms of sceptical empiricism 
which are only prepared to admit relationships between these separate 
spheres, either, on the basis of Humean constant conjunctions, or, 
disarmingly, forcing opponents of a more ‘holistic’ persuasion into a 
travesty of explanation based on multiple interactions, reductions, 
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interpolations, homologies and the like1.  Once installed it then proceeded 
to expunge alternative explanations of causation based variously on 
essences and natures grounded in what would be described in 
contemporary philosophical terms as realist or essentialist modes of 
explanation.  It is a central contention of this review that such modes of 
explanation and their attendant methodological architecture are required 
to explain the apparent contemporary dissolution of the eighteenth 
century categorical separations.  However, it is also apparent that such 
perspectives are absent from contemporary deliberations on cultural value 
and that such absence is not explained by mere oversight, but by what 
the philosopher Scott Meikle describes as the ‘metaphysical reform’ of the 
principle categories of thought which can be detected as far back as the 
fourteenth century2, but which came into its own in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century concept of utility3, and which has continued to 
dominate British thought about culture ever since.   
 
That key questions asked in critical theory of the eighteenth century 
codification of capitalist modernity concerning the philosophy of art, its 
entrapment in the aesthetic and its dissociation from questions of truth 
and morality should be being asked now, is not coincidental.  At a time 
when capitalism is manifestly shedding its postmodernist cultural 
																																																													
1 The social historian Edward Thompson fought a small war against this intellectual capitulation to 
atomism and its variants in the social sciences in Thompson (1978). 
2 See for example, Kaye (2000) for an explantion of the emergence of scientific thought in early 
moderm Europe, and especially, the relationship between speculation on the nature of money and the 
formation of scientific categories. Richard Seaford makes a compelling argument for looking further 
back to the Ancient Greeks (Seaford 2004). 
3 It might seem somewhat anglocentric to foreground utility in this way.  Whilst England is the home 
territory of utilitarianism and the contemporary interest in ‘cultural value’ might seem to be a reaction 
to this particularly English of philosophies, its influence on accounts of those human activities 
(mis)identified as economic cannot be under-estimated. 
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carapace, it is no surprise that culture, art, its value and its connectivity 
to questions of ethics and truth are being asked again in response to inter 
alia, concerns for meaning beyond consumerism; the need to revive the 
sources of social and political critique, and, against the fundamentalism of 
the age, redefine the purposes of economic life in ways that support 
human and social sustainability.  The philosophers and political 
economists of the eighteenth century sensed that theirs was an age of 
profound changes and that such changes were especially manifest in the 
distinctions and relationships between economic, ethical and aesthetic life.  
That the emergent nineteenth century theoretical orthodoxy attempted to 
reduce these three to one – utility – in the face of a romantic rearguard 
action to at least maintain two – the economic and the aesthetic – only 
serves to illustrate the importance of what was at stake.  This review 
argues that if the contemporary concern with cultural value is to mean 
anything worthwhile, then it is only by being projected against a larger 
backdrop of change – actual and potential – that its significance can be 
properly discerned.  The review suggests that the present moment might 
be productively compared with the latter half of the eighteenth century in 
that in both eras theory was and is tasked to grapple with complex 
structural and temporal changes in the organisation of society4.  Insofar 
as eighteenth century theory aimed to codify the new arrangements of 
																																																													
4 The intellectual relationships between value, utility, the aesthetic and the ethical have been the subject 
of an undercurrent of literature on the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but for the most part, 
this literature has stepped back from considering how such relationships related to theoretical 
codifications of wider society.  Kurt Heinzelman (1980) suggests that the evolving approach to the 
imaginative at the end of the eighteenth century was more deeply implicated in the development of 
economic ideas than has usually been assumed.  Catherine Labio (1997 and 2004) makes a very 
compelling case for a persistent role for the aesthetic in Adam Smith’s thought between The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations, challenging appropriations of Smith to a logic of pure 
economic reasoning.  In a similar vein, Richard Bronk (2009) makes a case for the role of the 
imagination in the development of early economic thought in the nineteenth century and by extension 
makes a claim for the role of imagination in contemporary economic explanation. 
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market society against the absolutism of feudal hierarchy (Anderson 
1974a  &  1974b) contemporary theory is grappling with the 
decomposition of market society in the face of a set of new acculturated 
and socially embedded economic imaginaries.   
 
(ii) Capitalism and social production 
This review shares Alasdair MacIntyre’s apprehension about the lack of 
historicisation in accounts of value (MacIntyre 2013).  Where MacIntyre in 
particular singled out philosophy’s tendency to de-temporalise the 
philosophy of ethics, this review argues that the same can also be said of 
economic and aesthetic value.  Whilst this can clearly be demonstrated 
with respect to the eighteenth and nineteenth century accounts of both, 
there also appears to be a lack of historical awareness in the 
contemporary treatment of cultural value. Twenty-first century capitalism, 
has, against its alleged historically universalizing nature, been shown to 
be radically incomplete, unfinishable and subject to unpredictable and 
largely unmanageable instability.  It is this realisation that casts the 
cultural value debate in a different light.  In their own way, the thinkers of 
the eighteenth century detected, if not the fundamentally crisis prone 
nature of capitalism (that would only really come to fruition with Marx), at 
least the need for a regulatory principle that would allow its operations to 
be explained as if law-like, and, drawing on physical scientific concepts, 
they constructed a regulatory principle called value.  What the aesthetic 
would do for the sensuous subjective experience and contemplation and 
their inter-subjective communication among the educated subjects of civil 
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society, and universal moral precept would do for ethics, value would 
similarly perform for the regularised transmission of commodities in the 
political economy.   
 
The thinkers of the eighteenth century were fully alert to the mutually 
conditioning and equally mutually excluding separations that defined each 
sphere.  Where they differ, however, is in their estimations of their 
significance.  The English aesthetes Shaftesbury, Burke, (and their Scotts-
Irish counterpart Hutcheson) regarded these concepts as the necessary 
architecture for a well regulated society and good conduct.  Taken aback 
by the model of the self-interested materialism offered by Thomas Hobbes 
in Leviathan (Hobbes 1957) and (somewhat more satirically) by Bernard 
de Mandeville in The Fable of the Bees (de Mandeville 1970), Shaftesbury 
and Hutcheson adopted Lockeian philosophy to argue on behalf of 
humankinds natural altruism as a principle of social regulation.  Adam 
Smith accepted this division famously in The Wealth of Nations (Smith 
1981), but maintained anxieties about the disconnection of moral 
judgment from material life.  Immanuel Kant, arguably the great 
intellectual codifier of the separation in his critical project of defining Pure 
Reason (Kant 1929), Practical Reason (Kant 1996) and Judgment (Kant 
2007)  defined the spheres with great clarity but only, as contemporary 
Kantian scholarship has increasingly demonstrated (Kneller 2007), against 
an on-going project to define the valid ethical basis for a future society.  It 
is not just of historical interest that Kant defined his political vision in 
terms of a society of independent petty commodity producers (property-
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owners) bound together by an ethico-aesthetic ideal5.  It was, however, 
only in the nineteenth century when the fuller consequences of the 
division would be worked out, as, on the one side, economics came to 
represent the apogee of subjective experience (utility) and the aesthetic 
was relegated, ultimately, into gilded bohemian marginality.  Political 
economy in its more critical forms (Ricardian and Utopian Socialism, for 
example) attempted a rearguard defence of maintaining the link at least 
between economy and ethics (Stafford 1987) and William Morris (Morris 
1993, Thompson 1977) would later try to recuperate the aesthetic into his 
ethical vision of a society of independent producers.  However, it is only 
with Marx and a subsequent critical tradition of nineteenth and twentieth 
century thought that the potential transformative supercession of the 
division would come to be seen as the immanent potential of capitalism 
itself.  Marx defined this separation and codification as “abstraction”, a 
process of dynamic reification subject to processes of emergence, 
ascendancy and decline. 
 
That tradition, inspired by Marx, has been conspicuous in its tracing of the 
life of abstraction through the economic long waves of an ever-
increasingly aestheticised twentieth century capitalism and which has laid 
the basis for developments in the twenty-first century6.   It hardly goes 
																																																													
5 One can construct this account by combining Kant’s categorical imperative not to treat humans as 
means, but always as ends, with some of his scattered comments on politics and the state and his 
approach to the sensus communis in the Critique of Judgment. 
6 This particular literature is vast but important contributions in this tradition include within the Marxist 
lineage Lukacs (1972), Adorno et al (2007), Adorno and Horkheimer (1997), Marcuse (1968), Adorno 
(1998), Horkheimer (1974, 2012), Schmidt (1971), Jameson (1974, 1998, 2012) and important 
interlocuters such as Bourdieu (1984), Habermas (1985, 1991) and Baudrillard (1975, 1981, 2001, 
2005). 
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without saying that the dominant locus of critical thought at the end of the 
twentieth century privileged the routines and practices of consumption as 
activities distanced from production; activities which could find meaning 
without reference to the routines of capital accumulation, commodification 
and exploitation.  It is worth noting just how short this period lasted, as 
questions of production and its intimate relationship with consumption re-
emerged in both theory and practice in the latter decade of the twentieth 
century and the first decade of the twenty-first.  What is even more 
striking is that the ground on which this re-emergence takes place is 
precisely in the realm of culture, but in ways that are cognisant of the 
possibility that contemporary conditions require us to take, in Bernstein’s 
terms a post-aesthetic perspective.  
 
Those conditions are represented in the form of a series of culturally 
sedimented economic imaginaries, the cultural economy, the creative 
economy and the ethical economy, for example, which, in different ways, 
problematise the dualistic character of contemporary capitalist society.  It 
is increasingly a society which is at one and the same time seemingly 
shaped to its foundations by the commodity-form, but in which 
commodity exchange is undergoing metamorphosis by a combination of 
technological social mediation and  collaboration and cooperation; 
conjoining the aesthetic and the ethical in an allegedly new form of value.  
Such forms prompt a range of sub-speculations about the role of creativity 
in a post-postmodern world; the apparent re-constitution of the creative 
subjectivity following the waning of the 1960s high modernist rejection of 
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artistic authorship; a renewal of art’s critical faculty, and, perhaps more 
surprisingly, a willingness to even question the foundational Cartesian 
artistic cogito with varieties of post-Cartesian subjectivity embracing 
epistemes of environmental cognition, embodied knowledge and, more 
recently, affect.  How are we to understand the significance of these 
phenomena?  How these two orders of social reproduction on the one side 
interact, condition and shape one another is perhaps the central question 
of our period.  
 
Why does this matter?  Throughout the three hundred or so years of 
capitalist development, varied attempts, both progressive and 
conservative, have attempted to reconcile the codified spheres of 
abstraction.  It is no surprise that contemporary critiques of 
postmodernism find its celebration of the ephemeral and the apparent a 
little too conducive to the baroque machinations of neo-liberal capitalism.  
Of a different order, numerous attempts to reconcile art and society under 
the banner of social engagement (“applied art”), or, slightly more 
militaristically - “intervention” - founder on the unavoidable unwillingness 
on the part of many of its practitioners to release art from the self-
legitimating grasp of the aesthetic.  It is within this context that this 
critical review places the concept of cultural value.  Its central argument is 
that the conditional relationship of aesthetics (culture) to value 
(economics) and ethics (normative value) in the early twenty first century 
is inscribed with the historic tensions, contradictions, partial resolutions 
and aporias of their original separation and codification, as separate 
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spheres in the long wave of pre-capitalist development.  The long shadow 
of late capitalist development challenges any suggestion of easy 
contemporary reconciliation.  However, that doesn’t exclude the possibility 
that the terms of their relationship might be under historical 
renegotiation, a process that is illuminated in this review by drawing on 
three ideas. 
 
The first is the historically specific significance of the alignment of art 
(creativity) with “general social technique” (Marx 1973, 704-706) at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century which is at the heart of 
contemporary imaginaries of the cultural economy.  The significance of 
this alignment is that it denies the possibility of thinking of value without 
thinking in terms of production and its relationship to processes of agency 
and subjectivity.  In this regard I have drawn on the work of the British 
art historian and philosopher John Roberts, and in particular his book The 
Intangibilities of Form: Skill and De-Skilling of Art After the Readymade 
(Roberts 2007) which offers the theoretical resources for interrogating 
how the expansion of creative production in the early twenty-first century 
begins to expose the conjoined aesthetic, ethical and economic tensions at 
the heart of the new political economy.  What is particularly important for 
the argument of this review is that Roberts reconnects culture with social 
production, locating its purposes in immaterial labour.  As he explains: 
“Artistic skills find their application in the demonstration of conceptual 
acuity, not in the execution of forms of expressive mimeticism” (Roberts 
2007, 3 italics as in original). The second resource I have drawn upon is 
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the account of “abstraction” in Marx’s explanation of capitalism.  Here I 
have drawn on two different but for my purposes complementary 
explanations.  The first is Geoffrey Kay and James Mott’s Political Order 
and the Law of Labour (Kay and Mott 1982) that argues that abstraction 
was the signal political development of capitalism, identified by political 
theory and political economy before Marx, but given its most refined and 
dynamic form in Marx’s thought.  Abstraction refers to the process by 
which the concrete particularities of, for example, persons and things 
come to be given new form and identity when they are counterposed to a 
formalised universal expression of their particularity.  Important 
abstractions include value, right, law, state, citizen, money, capital and so 
forth.  They are peculiar entities because although they are known in 
every day discourse by their particularity, they exist as self-subsistent 
universals – and only do so in the context of capitalism, defining 
capitalism as a socio-economic formation.  One of the most challenging 
and conflict-ridden abstractions of capitalism is the “aesthetic”.  It is 
conflict-ridden because it is the only abstraction that “mourns” its creation 
(Bernstein 1993, 4)7.  Where the abstractions of value (money, capital) 
and ethics (rights, law) subtend as their own end and measure, the 
aesthetic was cast adrift into autonomy.  Kant was especially sensitive to 
this and tried to reconcile the worlds of pre-theoretic judgment (in Kant’s 
aesthetics judgment has no predefining concept) with inter-subjective 
capacity (aesthetic judgment is the corner-stone of humankind’s unsocial 
sociability). Deprived of the very means by which it might articulate its 
																																																													
7 “What sort of beast might beauty be if in considering it we are not considering how the world is 
(truth), how we do or should comport ourselves in the world (morality), or what might be useful or 
pleasurable to us?” (Bernstein 1993, 3).  Bernstein’s answer is unequivocal: “A silent beast, then, given 
voice only through the gestures of approximation and analogy to what it is not” (ibid). 
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value, the aesthetic was offered two options: to withdraw into a world of 
empty self-reflexivity (for example, MacIntyre’s emotivism), or, sacrifice 
its specificity to utilitarianism by finding an external logic – social value 
and economic value being two conspicuous contemporary examples.  As a 
universal, the aesthetic is the only abstraction without its own language; 
in fact it can be defined as without a language8.  Living in a world of 
abstraction results in a pronounced dual experiential parallax: a world of 
particularities given shape and form by their reflection in their universal 
other.  This parallax, the Japanese philosopher and political activist Kojin 
Karatani, argues is the essence of Kant’s codification of the distinctions 
between pure reason (science), practical reason (ethics) and judgment 
(beauty).  Whilst he argues for their separation, as has been mentioned 
previously,  later, in the final years of his life, Kant began to realise the 
consequences of this abstraction and returned to his earlier work on 
morality and political order to try and seek reconciliation.  However, by 
the end of the eighteenth century the capitalist genie was out of the 
bottle, and their simple reconciliation in a cosmopolitan society of ethically 
regulated petty producers of the beautiful was no longer an option, if it 
ever had been.  However, what Karatani argues, is that, against much 
Marx scholarship of the last hundred years or so, Marx’s account of 
abstraction as the essence of capitalism has much to owe Kant.  Kant did 
have an historical sensibility, but regarded abstraction as a transhistorical 
phenomenon.  Marx, influenced by Hegel, contextualises this abstraction 
as the essence of modern society with far-reaching repercussions about 
																																																													
8 This is the principal reason why those who would attempt to find a language for art whilst it is 
trapped within the aesthetic can but only fail.  The seemingly contrary notion that art speaks for itself 
is, both metaphorically and literally, a contradiction ad absurdum.	
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its limits, potential and replacement.  Karatani’s specific observation, 
incorporated into this review, is that abstraction exists in a constant state 
of tension requiring a methodological outlook he describes as transcritique 
(Karatani 2005).  Particularity taken by itself, is as one- sided as 
universality taken by itself.  The former can only lead to a naïve belief in 
authenticity9, the latter to entrapment within the order of reification10.  
What Karatani finds in Kant on this question, he equally finds in Marx.  It 
is what characteristically distinguishes them both as thinkers from 
positions that aim to critique reification from an assumed position of 
authenticity, and, on the other positions that take the reified forms at face 
value as actuality.  What is actually required is the ability to read both 
simultaneously as dynamic polar but mutually conditioning opposites.  
This is abstraction and moreover it is real. 
 
The idea that modern society might be driven by a reciprocating dialectic 
of particularity and universality is a peculiar one.  Its peculiarity has a 
source and the  identification of that source requires an outlook that 
rejects causal explanation by reference to accident and coincidence and 
instead seeks explanation through necessity and teleology.  It is a central 
argument of the review that the categorical separation of aesthetics from 
economy or society, or indeed morality or truth, occurs as a result of 
necessity, and equally, its supersession is also a matter of necessity.  That 
necessity, most importantly explains why reconciliation of these 
categories during the era of capitalism has been impossible to achieve.  It 
																																																													
9 Varieties of existentialism being important cases in point. 
10 Baudrillard is arguably one of the most well known exponents of this position as the simulacrum re-
defines all forms of particularity, leaving no trace of the pre-semiotic particular (Baudrillard 1983). 
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is not in the nature of capitalism to reconcile these domains, but to force 
them apart within its routine processes of reproduction. Now, explanations 
by reference to necessity in the arts, humanities and many areas of the 
social sciences are quickly denounced as deterministic, monadic, 
essentialist, reductive, simplistic, and worse, they are seen to invoke 
supra-social or extra-human agency, with more than metaphysical and 
even religious overtones.  There has been, however, a revival of interest 
in social explanation by reference to natural necessity11 over the last few 
as a result of the decay of post-structuralism and postmodernism which, 
whilst ostensibly offering critically deconstructive theoretical resources 
have actually eviscerated the capacity of critique to function, ultimately 
falling into dialogic traps by appeals to explanation by community 
consensus12.  In philosophy, critical theory and particular areas of social 
scientific investigation, scholars, who broadly subscribe to a range of 
positions nominally termed realism, naturalism or essentialism have 
offered robust rejections of the various charges and demonstrated that 
such charges largely rest on misrepresention of their position.  One such 
scholar who’s work I am especially indebted to in this Review is that of the 
philosopher Scott Meikle whose work on Aristotle (Meikle 1995) and Marx 
(1985) has been an invaluable source of insight. 
 
																																																													
11 Prompted by Roy Bhaskar’s work in the 1970s (see Bhaskar 1978 and 1979), forms of critical 
realism, essentialism and naturalism have been developed in sociology (Archer 1995, 1996, 2000, 
2007; Sayer 2000, 2005, 2011) and economics (Lawson 1999, 2003). 
12 These take many forms, but good examples include Wenger’s community of practice models 
(Wenger 1998); Knorr-Cetina’s (1999) models of scientific knowledge construction and myriad forms 
of social constructivism.   
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How does the review proceed?  In the first section I explain why I think 
the current set of approaches to what might be termed cultural value are 
misconceived, and rest upon an unquestioned narrowing of value 
associated with the rise and institutionalisation of utilitarianism as a meta 
account of value per se, notwithstanding the efforts by culturalists to 
distance themselves from its consequences.  It demonstrates how the 
source of the misconception lies in the failure of the culturalist perspective 
to go beyond addressing the symptoms of the problem to the underlying 
metaphysical assumptions of the utilitarian scheme.  The section 
demonstrates how the dominant utilitarian concept of value, which 
defenders of culture see as resulting in distortion, remains in place, unless 
its fundamental philosophical assumptions are challenged.  
 
The second section charts the pre-history of abstraction, identifying key 
post-medieval intellectual operations in its creation, including its co-
evolution with the new philosophies of knowledge that came to define 
inquiry in the period from the fourteenth to the early nineteenth centuries.  
Although a key battle in the debate was the terms on which the ethical 
might be distinguished from the material (the economic as it later came to 
be known), the codification of the aesthetic and its distinction from both 
was no less important, with writers intensely attempting to determine how 
far separation should go.  The significance of these shifts and changes for 
how we might understand the terms of contemporary debates about 
cultural value are discussed.  The section concludes by arguing that 
contemporary accounts of cultural value struggle to transcend the terms 
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of the eighteenth century debate, not because they fail to understand the 
separation historically, but because they fail to trace the separation to its 
source in abstraction.  
 
Section three examines Marx’s explicit theorisation of abstraction which 
goes on to set the terms for the development of an intellectual lineage 
which would throughout the twentieth century continue to challenge the 
aesthetic containment of art, not from a standpoint outside abstraction, 
but from a standpoint of the potential that abstraction sets in motion.  
Marx’s thought was teleological, not because it posited a historical 
terminus towards which society travels with inevitability, but because 
abstraction enabled society to develop new potentials which could only be 
realised by the supersession of abstraction.  In this review, intimations of 
this supersession are to be found variously in the new cultural economy 
imaginaries, in post-aesthetic theories of art, and in post-Cartesian 
accounts of artistic subjectivity.  This can be detected in a range of 
contexts, including inquiries into  the contemporary potential for creativity 
to represent un-alienated labour (“good work”); the re-valorisation of use-
value as an organising term of society and social interaction; 
technologically mediated forms of sociality and their relationships to 
regimes of exploitation, and in debates about the persistence, or 
otherwise of the general circuit of production in which production is seen 
as an iterative cycle of creation, production, distribution, exchange and 
consumption.  Thus far, although each of these topics has been addressed 
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from within critical theory, they haven’t been examined from the vantage 
point of the theory of abstraction.   
 
The final section draws the major conclusions of these two sections 
together and offers a brief critical counter-point to current attempts to 














CULTURAL VALUE: A PERSPECTIVE FROM CULTURAL ECONOMY 
	 23	
1. Cultural value: the emergence of a contemporary problem 
(i) Utilitarianism and the narrowing of value 
Over the last few years there has been a growing sense of unease among 
advocates for and practitioners of the arts and culture in Great Britain.  
Having co-opted economic logics into the public policy case for the arts 
and culture in the 1980s (Myerscough 1988) and developed those 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, there is a general sense that 
things have either gone disingenuously too far down this route, or, that 
the route has terminated in a politically far from palatable place 
(McGuigan 1996; Belfiore & Bennett 2008; Belfiore & Upchurch 2013). 
Advocates of the specific value of culture feel their case impaled on the 
horns of the dilemma explained by the philosopher Bernard Williams: 
Again and again defenders of such values are faced with the 
dilemma, of either refusing to quantify the value in question, in 
which case it disappears from the sum altogether, or else trying to 
attach some quantity to it, in which case they misrepresent what 
they are about and also usually lose the argument, since the 
quantified value is not enough to tip the scale (Williams 1993 [1972], 
88-89). 
 
Parochially, the cause of this dilemma is the doctrine of utilitarianism and 
its dominant role at the heart of public policy evaluation and selection in 
the UK.  Williams’ observations some forty years ago suggest that far 
from being a recent development, utilitarianism within policy enjoys a 
longer provenance, and, as its historians demonstrate, within political 
philosophy an even longer one extending back into the latter decades of 
the Eighteenth Century (Halevy 1972 [1928]; Plamenatz 1966).  The 
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contemporary objection to utilitarianism in the cultural field is also at odds 
with a long tradition of cultural utilitarianism in British policy, analysed by, 
among others Tony Bennett (Bennett, 1998).  The source of this particular 
unease is, however, more recent, and is a reaction to the perceived 
corrosive effect which economic logics, driven ostensibly by the dogma of 
neo-liberalism, have on the claimed exceptional status of culture within 
the wider public sphere, a status granted to it in the immediate post-War 
years institutionalised in the doctrine of the arms-length principle. What is 
important, however, is that for the advocate of culture, Williams’ dilemma 
has asserted itself with renewed vigour.   
 
The refusal to quantify is customarily based on the argument offered by 
culture’s advocates that it is intrinsically unquantifiable and requires a 
very different type of case when it comes to questions of its value.  It is 
time they have suggested, to make the case for culture in terms that are 
specific to it, and not borrowed from any other sphere of social, economic 
or political activity.  There is a well-known standard objection to this, 
drawn unsurprisingly from utilitarianism.  Specificity in public policy, it is 
argued by its opponents (O’Brien 2013), fails to provide an adequately 
discriminating apparatus by which competing means can be assessed 
against their respective abilities to achieve given ends.  Such objections 
also fuel the perception that specificity in the face of scarce resources 
amounts to special pleading (and worse, thinly masked vested interest)13.  
																																																													
13 Meikle (2000) notes the especially corrosive effect that the utilitarian scheme has on professional 
cultures and professionalism.  Professional activities that have a particular ‘end’ – health, education, 
public safety, and so forth, find their ‘ends’ without defence in the court of utilitarian judgment 
reducing them to pleading ‘means’ in mitigation. 
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To counter these lines of argument, advocates are increasingly exploring 
the potential of the concept cultural value. A number of earlier approaches 
have unconvincingly attempted to do this, including: revealed (expressed) 
preference; contingent valuation; hedonic pricing, and, subjective well-
being14.  
 
This attempt to provide a non-reductive account of cultural value capable 
of integrating culture within the current policy assessment systems of the 
United Kingdom represents one sort of challenge.  However, what this 
development also signifies, importantly for this review, is that this framing 
of the problem is both intellectually and parochially narrow.  The ambit of 
cultural value as a regulatory principle extends substantially beyond the 
needs and processes of the publicly funded cultural sector and indeed the 
broader public policy system.   
 
This narrowness can be explained in the following terms. Since the 
utilitarian revolution in anglophone thought in the nineteenth century 
(Halevy, 1928; Plamenatz, 1949; Schumpeter, 1954) value has been 
conceptualised as a relative term between objects or activities typified in 
such formulae as: x object A = y object B.  Valuation is essentially a 
comparative exercise, and it is unsurprising to find that within 
utilitarianism all forms of evaluation model themselves on economic 
																																																													
14 In each case, the presumed specific quality of culture can be ‘expressed’ through the preference 
behaviour of individuals.  This preference behaviour it is further presumed is to be measured through 
the monetary evaluations individuals place on their cultural activity.  In short, these approaches to 
cultural value are constrained to return to the very solution that is, in reality, the problem, and so, they 
are equally not only lacking in explanatory force, but also compound the issue. 
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exchange. This specific formulation is important because it wasn’t 
available to the classical political economists Adam Smith, David Ricardo 
and, for the purposes of this review, Karl Marx.  It wasn’t available 
because their thought rested on a fundamentally different metaphysics 
and a different relationship to the ways in which the world is ordinarily 
described. For the utilitarian thinkers the world consists of abstracted 
rational subjects, goods, and, a new abstraction, labour – which we will 
come to later.  Things, for the classical political economists, by contrast 
are particular, specific and their capacities are intimately inscribed in their 
natures.  What they can be used for therefore is also specific to them and 
connected to these qualities.  Smith, Ricardo and Marx all used a common 
term for this notion of use; they all talked of use-value or value in use.  
However, in their hands, use-value could not be abstracted from the 
specific use-values of individual objects.  There is no universal use-value 
that can be independently examined aside from the specific use-values of 
objects.  Whether these objects are found in nature or are the artefacts of 
human activities is irrelevant at this point.  Use-value could not therefore 
be the basis of value, since this required some common quality in terms of 
which different things could be compared and evaluated and since use-
value is specific to each object, it cannot perform this function. 
 
How then did the utilitarian philosophers arrive at utility?  The first 
element in the intellectual architecture of utility is the utilitarian account 
of human subjectivity that differs markedly from what had gone before.  
Insofar as pre-utilitarian thought held to an overt account of human 
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subjectivity, it was intimately bound up with societal notions such as 
hierarchy or order.  Utilitarianism fused the emerging notion of 
individuality with the growing notion of rationality.  It was a simple step 
then to posit the notion of the rational individual endowed with autonomy 
and capacity for action.  However, then Utilitarianism needed such rational 
individuals to have a goal.  Since the individual is now endowed with 
rationality and the capacity for action, the goal should be similarly 
individual.  The notion of ‘happiness’, understood as the pursuit of 
pleasure and the avoidance of pain, came to define the goal of the rational 
individual.  However, for the individual to be able to assess competing 
ends, such happiness needs to be expressed in measurable form.  Utility 
was proffered as the means by which the rationalising processes of the 
individual could compare different options and evaluate choices.  The 
concept of utility is extremely useful here for this kind of approach, for 
two reasons.  First, since it is the operations of the sovereign rationalising 
individual, it needs no further explication than that which is meaningful to 
the individual – no other authority matters15.  Since it appears to be the 
means by which individuals compare competing alternative courses of 
action, it can be assumed to be quantitative.  It is then a short leap to the 
notion of utility as the universal means by which the rationalising 
subjectivity functions.  The later nineteenth century economists who take 
up the notion of utility as the foundation stone of their economic theory 
then go a step further.  As Meikle (2000) points out, in the time between 
the publication date of John Stuart Mill’s Principles of Political Economy 
																																																													
15 The doctrine of utility’s disavowal of inter-subjectively valid critique persists to day in a whole range 
of postmodern theories, and even in accounts of the creative industries (Potts, Cunningham, Hartley 
and Ormerod 2008; Potts 2011). 
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(1848) and that of William Stanley Jevons’ The Theory of Political 
Economy (1871) the notion of utility, or usefulness in consumption, has 
given way to the notion of usefulness in buying and selling.  The circle, it 
seems, is complete; utility is the universal yardstick of human happiness 
and which has its ultimate expression in the transactional act of exchange.  
The utilitarian implications for the understanding of economic behaviour 
became explicit and set economics on a specific methodological course 
heralded by Jevons in the following berating terms: “…it is to the neglect 
of Economists to obtain clear and accurate notions of quantity and degree 
of utility that I venture to attribute the present difficulties and 
imperfections of the science” (Jevons 1871, ix).  From this point on, utility 
freed economics to eliminate considerations of quality from its 
deliberations as the world of ordinary experience came to be refracted 
through the lens of utility-maximisation.  The only scientific approach to 
economic explanation and evaluation was one in which the specificities of 
the world of people, things and activities could be set aside, and in their 
place, economics could model the quantitative relationships between the 
new entities of the economic universe – goods, capital, money and labour.    
 
This is as true for ethics or public policy as it is for say economics.  It is 
very difficult for the utilitarian philosophers to avoid the consequence of 
their premises; that is, that in utilitarian philosophy all values are 
commensurable.  Utilitarianism, logically, therefore draws no distinction 
between domains of value.  All value judgments bring themselves back to 
the measuring stick of utility.  Ethics, politics, society and economy are all 
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reducible to the same isometric architecture of value based on the tacit 
utility-maximising impulses of the rationalising individual16. The 
contemporary expression of this provides the context in which advocates 
of culture have found their arguments judged.   It is this, of course, which 
conditions the contemporary debate about cultural value, insofar as it is a 
debate shaped by the need to set priorities in British public policy.  It is 
part of the argument of this review that the construction of the aesthetic 
as a category of critical understanding in the eighteenth century preceded 
in parallel with the development of the doctrine of utility.  Indeed, they 
are intimately connected, as they are both a product of the abstraction 
that takes place in the political and social order. 
 
This mutual shaping can be readily evidenced in a short review of the 
historical conceptual architecture of what is currently understood as 
cultural value, identifying how and why culture figured in the intellectual 
construction of market economy in the period from the fourteenth Century 
to the early nineteenth century.  Culture (and the aesthetic) it can be 
argued, especially in European thought from the late seventeenth century 
through to the mid-nineteenth, shaped the central forms of subjectivity of 
market economy, delineating a sphere of individual identity and action 
appropriate to the new routines that it inscribed into social life. This can 
be traced through a series of theoretical shifts and insights that, whilst 
																																																													
16 It is this architecture that has been institutionalised, for example, in the body politic of the UK system 
of government and public policy summarised formally in The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation 
in Central Government published by Her Majesty’s Treasury. This volume sets out guidance on how 
the preferred utilitarian schema must be used to evaluate the competing alternative means for achieving 
a given policy objective.  The objectives, needless to say, are also inscribed in appropriately utilitarian 
terms as the objective of maximising the happiness of the greatest number. 
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building a new form of subjectivity on the foundations of market economy, 
also suppressed its critical alternatives.  Thus we can trace a line of 
descent from Thomas Hobbes and Bernard de Mandeville in the mid 
seventeenth century through Locke’s reconstruction of the category of the 
understanding in the late seventeenth century; its influence on the work 
of the Third Earl of Shaftsbury and Francis Hutcheson on aesthetics, 
morals and metaphysics; the scepticism of Hume; Bentham’s attempt to 
eliminate contingency from market economy which then becomes, 
through the early work of Samuel Bailey in the early nineteenth century, 
the cornerstone of Mill and Jevons reconstruction of political economy as 
the modern discipline of economics.  The central assumptions of the 
marginalist revolution are then carried over into the contemporary field of 
cultural economics that struggles inadequately to deal with contemporary 
developments in the cultural field. This tradition encompasses a number of 
trajectories.  Politically, this lineage maps out the logic of the liberal state 
forms appropriate to market economy.  It encapsulates what the Canadian 
philosopher CB MacPherson described as the theory of possessive 
individualism (MacPherson 1962).  However, in order to fulfil this objective 
the world and how humans know it had to be reconstructed.  Locke’s 
philosophical empiricism or sensationalism provided an ostensibly anti-
metaphysical epistemology that laid the foundations for the required form 
of subjectivity of market economy.  Shaftsbury and Hutcheson (the latter 
especially representing a halfway house between Locke’s sensationalism 
and Hume’s scepticism) develop this insight, deepening the concept of 
subjectivity by defining a sphere of aesthetic or cultural competence that 
enabled the new bourgeois subject to relate to the world in ways that 
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would sacrifice consumption for investment, supported by a new 
aesthetically inflected moral sensibility.  Hutcheson in particular makes 
this connection explicit, paving the way for later economists to take his 
account of subjectivity for granted.   
 
Hutcheson plays an important role in the historic intellectual crossroads 
reached by market economy in the mid-seventeenth century.  In 1744 he 
published a new textbook of moral philosophy and metaphysics for use at 
the University of Glasgow.  It is written in explicit rejection of the then 
prevailing Aristotelian form of moral philosophy taught using the textbook 
of the Dutch Aristotelian philosopher Gerard de Vries.  Hutcheson, we 
should note at this point, was Adam Smith’s teacher and predecessor as 
Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow.  Whist the Scottish 
Enlightenment itself continued to entertain a wide range of intellectual 
traditions, there is a distinct turn against the Aristotelian tradition in 
Anglophone thought at this point.  Dismissed as ‘mere’ metaphysics, 
Aristotle’s account of knowledge, ethics and, especially his critique of 
things that would later become termed ‘economic’, place his intellectual 
heritage at a discount.  Aristotle’s essentialist or naturalist influence would 
however, continue to inform currents of thought in continental Europe.  
Immanuel Kant, although breaking with it in important ways, reinstates a 
teleological conception of human development or ‘ends’, especially with 
respect to his theories of morality and their intimate connection with the 
worlds of aesthetic judgment (much maligned in the twentieth century as 
a naïve belief in ‘progress).  GWF Hegel introduces the dialectic into 
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Aristotle’s account of essences or natures and Karl Marx famously sets the 
whole edifice on its materialist feet.  This tradition is the core that lies at 
the heart of contemporary cultural economy.  To extend the provocation, 
it is this missing tradition that is actually capable of coherently explaining 
the role of culture and the aesthetic in the formation of market economy 
then, and contemporary developments in their relationships now.  It is the 
only theoretical framework capable of offering any real insight into the 
ways in which culture and cultural value are re-enacting their historical 
eighteenth century role in constructing the subjective and normative 
conditions of contemporary society. 
 
(ii) Capitalism and the cultural economy 
Questions of cultural value have been explicitly raised during the course of 
the last twenty years in the context of new forms of cultural production 
and consumption and the cultural life of the community more broadly.  
There is a lineage of sorts that connects, for example, the interest in 
cultural production in pre-New Labour (1997-2010) local cultural policy 
with contemporary modellings of on-line economies of cultural and 
creative production.  Whilst the commercial for-profit cultural and creative 
industries invoke concepts of value that extend beyond the purely 
financial, the growing association of culture with practices of social 
production17 raises another set of challenges of a different order.  A 
number of writers have begun to ask to what extent the emergence of 
																																																													
17 Social production in this context refers to two sorts of activities, often complementary; first, 
productive activities, the product of which is appropriated socially without the intermediation of 
exchange or the commodity-form (in its highest expression, money), and, not-for-profit productive 
activities, the product of which does enter into a process of commodity circulation. 
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socialised cultural production represents a potential, but fundamental re-
configuration of the social relationships of capitalist production with 
implications for how we might think about culture.  Adam Arvidsson, for 
example, has suggested that the development of socialised economies in 
the fields of culture and creativity require a fundamentally different 
regime of evaluation than that of Utilitarianism (Arvidsson 2009).  In his 
view, sociality itself has become the sought-for substance of value in the 
world of socialised production and consumption.  Quantity begins to be 
important here.  Social production has always existed in market economy, 
and not only through the state, but through systems of mutuality, 
cooperative production, domestic production and reproduction, and so 
forth.  It is possible that the growth of socialised forms of cultural 
production and consumption within the routines of market economy are 
simply a continuation of well-established, but economically subordinate, 
forms of social production.  However, there may be grounds for thinking 
that something more significant is happening.  The cultural intensification 
of capitalist economies expressed in the growth of the cultural and 
creative industries has begun to raise questions about the persistence of 
what Marx described as the law of value, that is a principle of productive 
regulation based on the accumulation of money as capital.  If this 
principle, and its intellectually apologetic expression in the conceptual 
architecture of utilitarianism are now in question, then what is it that is 
replacing them?  Moreover, if there are detectable processes at play here, 
what are their implications for the way in which we should approach the 
contemporary concern with cultural value?  Arvidsson (and his 
collaborators) suggest that socialised production re-introduces the lost 
CULTURAL VALUE: A PERSPECTIVE FROM CULTURAL ECONOMY 
	34	
tradition of Aristotelian ethical thinking back into consideration of the 
meanings and purposes of culture in the modern world18.  It is the 
argument of this critical review that contemporary forms of socialised 
cultural production and consumption not only expose the limits of the 
utilitarian scheme and its stranglehold on questions of value, but that they 
demand a wholesale re-engagement with the tradition of critical thought 
that utilitarianism displaced.  Therefore, this review offers the following 
provocation to both utilitarians and their culturalist opponents: there are 
really only two accounts of cultural value to choose from defined by their 
traditions of intellectual inquiry; the first, the familiar utilitarianism based 
on an ontology of materialist atomism applied to social and human activity 
and behaviour (and which has its modern inheritors in the domain of 
cultural economics); the second, a variety of naturalism or essentialism 
which incorporates culture (the realm of the symbolic) into its explanation 
of contemporary social and economic forms, and especially their capacity 
to promote human good.   
 
There are implications in this for both utilitarians and their opponents.  
Counter-posing these two traditions exposes the intellectual and political 
inadequacies of utilitarianism, both historically, and contemporarily.  
However, there isn’t much cheer for utilitarianism’s opponents in the 
cultural sphere either, unless they are prepared to fundamentally change 
their philosophical outlook.  A review of the intellectual construction of 
such ideas as culture and the aesthetic (and their value) reveal their role 
																																																													
18 Adrian Walsh summarises the Aristotelian concept of value succinctly in the following terms: 
“Value, then, for human beings resides in the realisation of human nature and the realisation of this 
nature involves our realisation of our potential for flourishing” (Walsh 1997, 85). 
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in constructing the basic architecture of market economy (utilitarianism 
being its most reductive expression) and the suppression of its critical 
alternative.  Moreover, in their insistence on a univocal denunciation of 
‘economy’, its critics actually perpetuate this state of affairs and inhibit 
contemporary critical thought’s purchase on contemporary social, 
economic and political developments, represented in, for excample, forms 
of socialised cultural production. 
 
Cultural economy’s ability to offer a differentiated account of economy 
provokes a contrary sense of unease, and that is, that the anti-economy 
advocates of cultural value may have been over-hasty in seeking to 
distance their cause from the logic of what they uncritically bundle up 
imprecisely under the term economics.  Advocates of culture appear to 
have only one understanding of economics, that which has been variously 
described as neo-classical or orthodox economics launched by the 
supposed nineteenth century ‘marginalist revolution’ in economic theory.  
That such economic theorisation and its implications for understanding 
how society and individuals value different activities has been the 
dominant way in which economics has been understood (by its supporters 
and detractors equally) for more than one hundred years is 
incontrovertible.  It is also not unsurprising that advocates of culture find 
it difficult to envision economics in a different way since the intellectual 
architecture of neo-classicism and marginalism has had such a pervasive 
and sedimented influence way beyond its disciplinary boundaries (Clarke 
1982).  Indeed, as the philosopher Scott Meikle has argued, marginalism 
CULTURAL VALUE: A PERSPECTIVE FROM CULTURAL ECONOMY 
	36	
was instrumental in reconstructing both scientific thought and everyday 
cognition in ways amenable to the development of market economy and 
its operations, and as such, it has in effect become its own court of appeal 
(Meikle 2000)19.  What cultural economy demonstrates is that the 
reification of the bundle of activities typically termed economic is simply 
the economic analogue of the reification that terms another group of 
activities the aesthetic, or the cultural.  It is one of the central arguments 
of this review that whilst the role of the former as the intellectual 
architecture of the market economy has been critically acknowledged and 
examined, the role of the latter in the same exercise has received 
considerably less attention.  Opening up both bodies of ideas to a common 
critical scrutiny, may not only reveal important insights into how we have 
arrived at the current cultural value challenge, but, may also suggest 
ways, potentially by both positive and negative inference, in which we 
might answer this challenge now and in the future. 
 
The ideological dominance of marginalism and its theoretical 
underpinnings in Utilitarian philosophy, however, has been met by a series 
of critical alternatives. Ranging from Marxist political economy, through 
some forms of evolutionary economics to institutional economics and 
																																																													
19 In his An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation first published in 1789 and 
corrected in 1823, Jeremy Bentham, with the benefit of the theoretical work undertaken by his 
predecessors, can blithely opine: “When a man attempts to combat the principle of utility, it is with 
reasons drawn, without his being aware of it, from that very principle itself.  His arguments, if they 
prove anything, prove not that the principle is wrong, but that according to the applications he supposes 
to be made of it, it is misapplied.  Is it possible for a man to move the earth? Yes; but he must first find 
out another earth to stand upon” (Bentham, 1967, 128-129).  Only, of course, if one accepts the 
utilitarian starting-point. Bentham’s collapsing of the distinction between reason (understanding) and 
practice in pursuit of a world free of contingency (or to put it another way, his conflation of 
geocentrism with egocentrism in the above citation), is something that contemporary culturalists find 
difficult to combat, unless they can spell out an alternative outlook.    
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various forms of contemporary cultural economy (and interesting 
combinations thereof), there has been and continues to be a healthy 
counter-narrative to marginalism and its theoretical assumptions and 
ideological preferences.  Although none of these perspectives has had any 
noticeable impact on public policy (why would they?) the emergence of a 
set of economic imaginaries based variously on culture, creativity, 
innovation and their alleged transformative potential which have had an 
impact on public policy, has prompted the need for perspectives that 
address economic matters in ways that either require substantial 
amendment of the Utilitarian scheme or, as will be argued in the 
conclusion of this review, its outright rejection. 
 
For the purposes of this critical review, this range of culturally sedimented 
post-industrial economic imaginaries operate under a number of 
souriquets: the cultural economy (du Gay and Pryke, 2002), the creative 
economy (Howkins 2002, 2009), the digital economy (Barbrook 1997 and 
2007) the attention economy (Davenport and Beck, 2001), the experience 
economy (Pine and Gilmore, 1999), the social network market (Potts et al 
2008) and the ethical economy (Arvidsson, Bauwens and Peitersen 2008; 
Arvidsson 2009; Arvidsson and Peitersen 2013) to name just a few.  
Whilst each of these has been annexed to dominant narratives of 
economic growth and market liberalisation, they can, through a critical 
lens, be seen to contain with varying degrees of awareness, 
hegemonically indigestible characteristics that place them in tension with 
these objectives and throw down a challenge to the central tenets of 
utilitarian-inspired economics: for example, one-dimensional utility can be 
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contrasted with polymorphous affect; instrumental calculation by 
phenomenological experience; the monadic subject by the relational 
subject; the exchange relation by interactive sociality; competition by 
collaboration; the ‘hidden hand’ by the ‘crowd’, static equilibrium by 
complex, disruptive emergence, and perhaps most challenging of all, the 
replacement of scarcity by abundance.  Only a differentiated concept of 
economy can adequately deal with this range of phenomena, both in 
terms of their explanatory power, and, in terms of their wider significance 
for our understanding of the relationship of culture to economy, 
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2. The aesthetic, economy and ethics: a natural history of 
abstraction 
(i) Money and aesthetics in the medieval world 
This section examines the set of intellectual shifts already alluded to 
earlier with respect to the formation and codification of the distinct 
spheres of economy, culture and society, or reason, the aesthetic and 
ethics.  Accounts of their history and formation might be taken to imply 
the existence of some form of pre-modern unity in the medieval world.  
No such unity needs to be implied, although for a number of key thinkers 
at the beginning of the modern period such as Hobbes and Locke who 
contributed to their codification, such a unity was taken to exist in a 
presumed pre-social ‘state of nature’.  So, although private property and 
exchange were regarded as present in the state of nature, the 
preservation of security required humans to depart it and accede to the 
rule of law under the state (Kay and Mott 1982) and thereby institute the 
modern categories of subject and object in the modern philosophy of law, 
and, pari passu, the codification of subject and predicate in the philosophy 
of knowledge.  What then becomes interesting is why thinkers of the 
eighteenth century then felt the need to codify a distinct realm of the 
aesthetic, and how and in what way did it relate to these other 
developments?  To answer these questions we need to understand, not an 
assumed pre-existent state of nature, but the state of intellectual 
engagement with the topic of beauty – which was, in the first instance, 
considered in relation to nature.  For this we need to take a brief 
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excursion into the medieval world where ideas about knowledge and 
beauty were bound up with the emergence of the money economy. 
 
In his books on medieval aesthetics, Umberto Eco describes an arc of 
development in thought about beauty which takes nature as its starting 
point, not art (1986, 1988). This arc begins with the medieval re-
examination of the Classical tradition (mainly Aristotle and elements of 
Plato); a progressive movement to integrate ideas about the beautiful 
with ideas about artistic production, and which, thereby sets in train a 
subsequent decline towards what Eco refers to as Mannerism20 and in his 
terms, its disquieting concerns with genius and the imagination.  In his 
desire to acknowledge the specific contribution of the medieval age to the 
formation of emergent aesthetic thought, Eco argues that the medieval 
mind addressed the question of beauty on a number of complementary 
levels.  It was certainly a mind that insisted on the beautiful as an 
attribute of the deity and an expression of the deity’s presence in the 
world.  But this didn’t restrict medieval ideas of beauty to the purely 
transcendental.  Its ideas encompassed both the intelligible idea of beauty 
(the non-sensuous, conceptual and abstract notion of beauty) and the 
sensuous idea of beauty (its location in feelings and in lived experience).  
Eco argues that acknowledgement of the latter is an important corrective 
to the modern world’s tendency to see nothing but abstract scholasticism 
in the thought of the Middle Ages.  He cites in evidence a wealth of 
material reflecting two positions on the sensuous.  One version of the 
																																																													
20 This is conceived broadly and encompasses the range of approaches to the philosophy of art and 
beauty of the eighteenth century.  It might, arguably, be extended to encompass the range of 
postmodern approached to art too. 
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medieval outlook associated with asceticism regarded the sensuous as a 
source of profound moral risk requiring diligent and enthusiastic 
proscription.  However, in the process it drew attention to the role of the 
sensuous in the medieval everyday world.  Less censorious was the 
acknowledgement that the sensuous should be seen as a legitimate part 
of everyday life, but one that could be judiciously controlled through 
teaching and precept.  Eco argues that in fact it is in the object of this 
teaching that the everyday worlds of the sensuous and the transcendent 
meet.  This meeting point has a very important implication for how we 
might understand cultural value.  Eco argues that: “Medieval 
taste...involved...an apprehension of all of the relations, imaginative and 
supernatural, subsisting between the contemplated object and a cosmos 
which opened on the transcendent”. (Eco 1986, 15)  The importance of 
objects is critical here.  The medieval mind didn’t simply contemplate the 
abstract and distanced.  The beautiful could be understood as a fusion of 
the sensuous and the intelligible, existing in the here and now, in the 
relationships that people had to objects, both those found in nature, and, 
those they made: “It meant discerning in the concrete object an 
ontological reflection of, and participation in, the being and power of God” 
(loc cit). 
 
What is at the heart of this thinking is a metaphysics that is fundamentally 
different to that on which utilitarianism is based, as we shall see shortly.  
In medieval thought, objects were still thought of through the lens of 
Aristotle’s metaphysics of things and their natures.  It is worth dwelling 
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briefly on its characteristic components because they have important 
significance for the way that Aristotle understood other human activities, 
particularly those activities that the modern mind bundles up as ‘economy’ 
and as ‘art’ respectively.  Aristotle’s metaphysics states that the world and 
its contents consist of things, their form or nature, their substance, as it is 
sometimes explained, and, their characteristic purposes (telos) which flow 
from that nature.  Aristotle’s view of the world is one that is in accord with 
the human experience of it.  We know it and the objects in it by their 
kinds and their ends.  Consequently, we know we are in error when we 
mistake a thing of one nature for a thing of another nature.  Scott Meikle 
explains the distinctive nub of Aristotle’s thought in the following way: 
Things that exist are of two kinds.  There are individual entities like a 
human, a house, a loaf, a sheep, or a bed, which are substances.  
And there are features that are not substances: qualities, quantities, 
and relations, like white or just, long or heavy, north or large, which 
though they exist, exist in a different way; not as substances do, but 
as attributes or modifications of substances.  These categories are 
the irreducible orders of being, and a quality, say, can no more be 
reduced to a quantity or a relation, than the number 9 can be 
reduced to a horse.  Aristotle’s philosophy is not conducive to 
overlooking or eliding differences of kind between things or 
attributes. (Meikle 1995, 13) 
 
This outlook Aristotle applies to humankind itself.  In his ethics he 
persistently asks what the substance, nature or end of humankind is.  This 
is often taken in modern scholarship to mean that Aristotle subscribed to 
what has become known as functionalism – perspectives recognised in 
certain kinds of sociology in the social sciences, and cybernetics in 
technology.  The Aristotelian philosopher Stephen Clark, however, 
challenges this interpretation.  Clark argues:”…the ergon of a variety of 
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living creature, tool, or organ is the particular form of life, of activity 
which ‘makes sense’ of its structure.” (Clark, 1975, 16)  In his philosophy, 
Aristotle proposes that the ergon of humankind is to live well in 
community.  The ability to live well is inextricably linked to Aristotle’s view 
of humankind as zoon politikon, often translated as a ‘social animal’.  
Living well, therefore, is dependent on the collective use of humankind’s 
resources to furnish it with the things that make life worth living.  He has 
a discussion of what counts as sufficient and is very clear: sufficiency is 
“that which on its own makes life worthy of choice and lacking in nothing”. 
(NE 1, 1097b, 14-15)  
 
Wealth in Aristotle’s view consists of useful things in numbers 
proportionate to the meeting of sufficiency. This notion of proportionality 
is important, as we shall see later when we examine Aristotle’s ideas 
about exchange, money and moneymaking.  How such sufficiency is 
obtained is dependent on the various activities needed for it.  Aristotle 
applies the same outlook to activities as he does to things.  Activities are 
to be understood by their characteristic form, nature or end and living well 
requires that activities be used for their proper ends.  Acquiring the things 
necessary for living well can be achieved in one of two ways.  The first is 
acquisition by producing, that is, the deployment of activities such as 
growing food, making furniture and weaving cloth.  In each case, the 
activity is proper to its end, farming for food, carpentry for making 
furniture and weaving to make cloth.  This particular type of activity 
Aristotle calls oikonomike, which broadly translates as the art of 
CULTURAL VALUE: A PERSPECTIVE FROM CULTURAL ECONOMY 
	44	
household management.  Part of the activities of oikonomike include the 
‘art’ of acquisition, but at this point Aristotle takes pains to distinguish 
acquisition which is subordinated to oikonomike and that which has 
become an unlimited end in itself - accumulation.  Acquisition, Aristotle 
terms chrematistike and it is closely linked to the act of exchange.  He 
distinguished two types.  The first type he regards as good because it is 
subordinated to the objective of living well within the community (using 
exchange to acquire the things needed by the community), the second 
type he regards as bad because it knows no limits and therefore ignores 
the requirement of sufficiency (exchange as a means to accumulation). 
 
Aristotle’s discussion of exchange is very important because it introduces 
a discussion of value that is completely at odds with, and in opposition to, 
the account given of value in the utilitarian scheme.  More importantly, it 
offers the basis for a compelling and persuasive rebuttal of its claims.  We 
earlier noted Aristotle’s particular analysis of exchange and it is to the 
details of that which we now return.  The details are important because 
they identify the terms over which competing accounts of value can be 
judged. 
 
Aristotle’s account of the relationship between wealth and exchange 
follows his account of the ends of different kinds of exchange activity.  
Exchange activity that has the end of acquiring something useful 
corresponds to use-value, the set of properties or characteristics which an 
object possesses and in virtue of which it can meet a specific purpose.  
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Exchange activity that is geared to the acquisition of money, however, 
plays another account of value into the picture.  Aristotle calls this 
exchange-value.  His explanations of both are intimately dependent on his 
account of the good life and are to be judged in light of this.  Use-value 
carries with it the end or purpose that specifies sufficiency for the good 
life.  Exchange-value intimates unlimited accumulation as an end in itself.  
However, Aristotle notes a relationship between them that he develops 
conceptually, in a manner entirely consistent with his metaphysics, by 
considering how they suggest an evolving social reality, and especially 
that aspect of social reality concerned with how the community maintains 
itself.  However, at this point we need to take a step back to look at how 
Aristotle analyses the specific structure of exchange. 
 
In analysing the two types of value (use and exchange), Aristotle notes an 
important difference.  As use-values, objects are differentiated from each 
other according to their purposes and the properties of them as objects 
that enable those purposes.  As exchange-values, objects appear to be 
able to stand in for each other.  Moreover, as exchange-values, different 
objects can be seen to be equal to or not be equal to each other.  The 
nature of this equality and where it comes from is a fundamental 
challenge for Aristotle.  His metaphysics insists that natural differences 
between objects cannot be eliminated by reference to their specific 
properties; these are precisely what makes them different.  But in order to 
be equal, they must be commensurable, and whatever substance makes 
them commensurable, in exchange for each other, they must possess 
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equal quantities of it.  The order is important.  Exchange expresses 
equality between the objects. Equality expresses their equivalence for 
each other.  This equivalence, by definition is quantitative.  To be capable 
of being measured quantitatively, the objects must be commensurable.  
In the philosopher Ruth Chang’s terms, there must be a “covering value” 
(Chang 1997b, 5) in terms of which the objects can be measured.  
Aristotle cannot find this covering value in their natural qualities and 
properties because these define the objects as different to each other.  In 
the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle attempts to resolve this challenge by 
considering three other candidates for the job: first money, then need, 
and then a combination of the two. 
 
Aristotle first considers money because it seems that money is in fact a 
measure of all things.  This, at first glance, seems reasonable.  If money 
can measure the exchange-value of all things then maybe it is the 
commensurating quality?  The problem here is the one identified above.  
Measurement presumes commensuration.  Measurement per se cannot be 
commensuration.  Commensuration must take place before measurement 
comes into the picture21.  If measure by itself created the thing measured, 
the implications for knowledge and a good deal more besides would be 
extraordinary: it is not possible to make a child grow by measuring her22.  
His second attempt tries to argue that need (chreia) functions as the 
commensurating quality since it is need that holds the whole system 
together.  However, he quickly drops this because need doesn’t lend itself 
																																																													
21 The confusions this insight causes at the heart of the utilitarian scheme will be returned to later. 
22 This logical certainty doesn’t of course, stop some people who self-describe as members of a modern 
sub-culture - ‘management’ - from subscribing to this irrational belief. 
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to a unit.  In other words, we now have the reverse problem.  We have 
commensuration, but we don’t have a measure.  His next solution is to try 
and bring both these ideas together with chreia forming the 
commensurating bond – because need is what holds things (people, 
community, society) together – and money forming the convention of 
measurement.  However, as Meikle argues, Aristotle is not convinced by 
this as his attempt to defend chreia as the candidate is far from 
convincing scientifically, something Aristotle himself is troubled by.  
Moreover, Meikle makes the important point that that which holds things 
together (one sort of theoretical problem) is not the same as the search 
for a commensurating quality (a different kind of theoretical problem)23.  
The differences between these types of theoretical problem and the care 
needed to ensure that putative answers do not just slip between them is 
important, as we shall see later with respect to both utilitarianism and the 
new sets of cultural economy imaginaries. 
 
We need to finish this brief excursus on Aristotle’s attempt to ground a 
theory of value by considering one other possibility.  A number of writers 
have tried to claim that Aristotle may have also subscribed to an early 
form of the labour theory of value.  However, the same problem is present 
here.  In Aristotle’s metaphysics, activities are subject to the same 
differentiating substances.  The nature of one activity is contained in its 
end or purpose.  For labour to be able to fulfil the condition of 
commensurability, activities would have to be reduced to a single 
																																																													
23 This significance of this observation for Aristotle’s account is obvious, but it also has important 
implications for a number of the modern cultural economic imaginaries. 
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homogeneous activity, an activity, by definition, without end.  Such a 
notion would not have been possible for Aristotle.  We shall return to this 
possibility later in our account of of Marx. 
Thus, what we can say about Aristotle is that he did recognise the need 
for a theory of value.  He did understand that the theory of value in 
exchange was intimately related to his ethical outlook, but that he couldn’t 
surmount the fundamental challenge of ascertaining the substance and 
measure of value.  What is important to note is that his account of 
exchange-value is logically secondary to his account of objects and their 
uses.  He is troubled by money and the measure of his achievement is 
that he did, with great lucidity, outline the key components of the 
problem.  Now we need to examine how his metaphysics shaped his 
account of art. 
 
Aristotle is credited with one of the most popular accounts of art: “art 
imitates nature”.  In modern terms this is largely taken to mean that the 
true purpose of art lies in its special capacity of mimesis, an idea Aristotle 
is alleged to have developed beyond Plato’s own fairly negative evaluation 
of it. Historically, this has tended to position Aristotle as a progenitor of 
semiosis and with a preoccupation for the representational.  However, 
Aristotle means something rather different.  In his Physics, this 
observation is set within a paragraph that goes on to explain that the 
imitation is not its capacity for mimesis, but that artful causes are the 
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same as natural causes24.  This reflects the fundamental outlook on 
ontology that Aristotle sets out in his Metaphysics: “Of things that come to 
be some come to be by nature, some by art, some spontaneously” (M 
1032a, 12-13). What unites them, before they become divided is that they 
come “to be by the agency of something and from something and comes 
to be something” (M 1032a, 13-14).   It is this which connects Aristotle’s 
scattered comments on art – the Poetics and the Rhetoric being important 
gatherings of his materials – with, for example his thought about poetry, 
tragedy and dramatic work more generally.  Nature consists of objects 
with natures – substances, and over time, those natures, barring 
accidents, are realised as ends.  However, contrasting with entities that 
occur as part of nature, Aristotle identifies another class of objects that he 
terms “’makings’” (M 1032a, 27) which are the product of human agency 
(art – techne), interacting with matter.  The important question is where 
does the form taken by these “makings” originate?  Aristotle is very clear: 
“from art proceed the things of which the form is in the soul” (M 1032b, 
1).  And, just in case his reader entertains any doubts about how such 
makings relate to Aristotle’s metaphysics, he adds the clarification: “By 
form I mean the essence of each thing and its primary substance” (M, 
1032b, 1-2).  Aristotle explains the relationship between agent, form and 
made object in the following terms: 
…art is identical with a state of capacity to make….All art is 
concerned with coming into being….how something may come into 
being which is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin 
is in the maker and not in the thing made (NE, 1140a, 9-13). 
																																																													
24 “But if on the other hand art imitates nature, and it is the part of the same discipline to know the form 
and the matter up to a point…: if this is so, it would be part of natural science to know nature in both its 
senses” (Ph, 194a, 22-27). 
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Their natures are embodied in their ends and vice-versa.  In the case of 
made objects, objects subject to the process of poiesis, their end is a 
product of “a true course of reasoning” (NE, 1140a, 10).  ‘Art” in 
Aristotle’s view does not take on its modern meaning, referring to a 
special set of activities within the division of labour.  Art, as his extensive 
references to it in the Metaphysics makes clear, refers to all kinds of 
‘making’ in which the process is guided by knowledge. 
 
It is perhaps a sort of testament to utilitarianism’s ubiquity that poiesis 
occupies such a lowly status in the modern imagination, in which 
consumption and utility reign.  Aristotle’s outlook is considerably more 
expansive: “the human race lives …by art and reasonings” (M, 980b, 27).  
And in a statement which resonates with a contemporary anti-utilitarian 
concern for the relationship of making to knowledge, especially the sort of 
knowledge that is tacit and embodied, Aristotle explains the origins of the 
knowledge of making: “…art arises, when from many notions gained by 
experience one universal judgment about similar objects is produced” (M 
981a, 5-7).  Aristotle was aware of the potential for damage to be done to 
art as a result of the intrusion of contrary or false ends into the 
relationship between agent and matter.  Aristotle is very worried by this 
ability of false ends to get mixed up with the proper ends of objects.  In 
his view it introduces an artificial end, contrary to nature.  However, from 
this are we to take it that Aristotle regards art as simply a form of poiesis? 
Aristotle is very clear on the relationship of art-making to poiesis.  He 
does regard art-making in the same way as he regards craft.  It is an act 
of artefact-making (he also extends the same description to what we 
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might now call services – health, for example) subordinated to the laws of 
nature and in accordance with the higher human attributes of praxis 
(activities appropriate to the ethical ends of humankind) and phronesis 
(morality).  He does, however, begin to draw a distinction between 
artworks and other everyday artefacts by reference to the types of ends 
that they might have.  Aristotle entertained an expansive view of the 
significance of art. Fundamentally, it should contribute to the proper end 
of humankind – to live well.  Living well, however, could encompass a 
wide range of activities, pleasure, entertainment, moral instruction, 
emotional release and so forth.   
 
The medievals also maintained Aristotle’s outlook that the proper uses of 
objects were only those activities appropriate to their nature.  Using 
objects for purposes for which they were not suited represented an ethical 
abuse.  In Aristotle’s thought the beautiful and the good in the realm of 
material objects and activities and their natures were closely related, and 
this idea carried over fully into the medieval world.  Eco notes its 
significance for historical scholarship and interpretation: 
This integration of values makes it difficult for us to understand 
nowadays the absence in medieval times of a distinction between 
beauty (pulchrum, decorum) and utility or goodness (aptum, 
honestum) (loc cit). 
 
Eco’s use of the term utility (at least this is how the word has been 
translated from Italian to English) serves to illustrate how far the 
utilitarian schema extends when the concept of utility meaning a general 
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sense of usefulness, can come to have such a narrow meaning.  However, 
Eco is in no doubt about the significance of this integrative view of beauty, 
present in the medieval world, for the contemporary world:  
Life appeared to them as something wholly integrated.  Nowadays 
perhaps, it may even be possible to recover the positive aspects of 
their vision, especially as the need for integration in human life is a 
central preoccupation in philosophy.  The way of the Medievals is no 
longer open to us, but at least the paradigm they offer us can be a 
source of valuable insights, and their aesthetic doctrines are here of 
great importance (loc cit, 16)  
 
The transition to more contemporary sounding approaches to aesthetics 
can be detected in the medieval period, albeit with some qualification.  
The medieval thinkers’ concept of beauty was expansive and extended 
way beyond more contemporary associations of the aesthetic with art.  
However, that didn’t stop them from beginning to relate their concept of 
aesthetics to art itself.  Although the initial association was often 
disapproving – seeing in art an inferior form of beauty – the medievals did 
begin to speculate on the source of the ideas that begin to distinguish art 
from other areas of human endeavour, albeit ideas which remain 
grounded in the quotidian. 
 
(ii) Capitalism, political economy and the aesthetic 
The transition from the medieval world’s engagement with Aristotle’s 
notion of art in relation to knowledge and ends towards the modern 
world’s account of art as a largely subjective experience is well 
documented in the history of aesthetics.  What is less well known is the 
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extent to which in this transitional phase, art and economy continued to 
meet over questions of value.  Now we can turn to certain ideas about this 
relationship developed in the eighteenth century.  Three tendencies 
become apparent throughout eighteenth century philosophy of aesthetics.  
The first is the tendency to separate artistic making out from general 
production so that it becomes not just a specialised branch of work, but 
an elevated one.  The second is the tendency then to narrow the purview 
of the aesthetic from a concern with its specific form of experience across 
a wide range of phenomena, including everyday objects and nature, to a 
more specific concern with the special effects of art.  Third, is the gradual 
introduction of a new metaphysics underpinning these shifts in which the 
sensory experience of the Cartesian cogito comes to dominate models of 
subjectivity25. 
 
The Scotts-Irish philosopher Francis Hutcheson is particularly important 
here.  Whilst his own purposes may have been to marry the progressive 
liberal philosophy of John Locke with the socially conservative morality of 
the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, his account of the relationship between 
ethics and aesthetics paves the way for utilitarianism (Fowler 1882; Kivy 
2003).  Hutcheson belonged to what has sometimes been called the 
Shaftesbury camp.  Politically he argued that morality was a product of 
society, to be contrasted with the ideas of Thomas Hobbes and Bernard de 
Mandeville who argued that morality was a product of nature.  The 
members of Shaftesbury’s group objected to the ultra-rationalist 
																																																													
25 David Hume represents a kind of exception here in that his philosophy actually denies a unitary 
subjectivity, but in its argument in favour of multiple or parallel subjectivities, it simply multiplies the 
Cogito, rather than questioning its constitution. 
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materialism of de Mandeville, and especially the consequences of his 
philosophy applied to understanding what is now typically called 
‘economy’.  Hutcheson sought a counter-balance to this rationalism by 
trying to find an alternative basis for both aesthetics (in his terms a 
concern pre-eminently with Beauty), and virtue (or morality).  His 
arguments concerning Beauty are what concern us here.  He begins in 
classically empiricist territory, explaining the centrality of the sensations 
to knowledge.  Sensory experience is the basis of the human engagement 
with the world.  However, he is dissatisfied with what he sees as the 
limitations of the five senses and wants to make an argument for another 
sense that would be sensitised to “Pleasure and Pain” (Hutcheson 2004 
[1725], 20-21).  This special sense is important, he argues, because: 
“Had we no such Sense of Beauty and Harmony; Houses, Gardens, Dress, 
Equipage, might have been recommended to us as convenient, fruitful, 
warm, easy; but never as beautiful” (ibid, 26)26.  As Terry Eagleton and 
others have noted, part of the intention in aesthetics was to codify a form 
of bourgeois sensibility that could be simultaneously distinguished from 
the base (and rather aristocratic) enjoyment of luxury and which would 
encourage abstention from consumption in order to promote investment 
(Campbell 1987; Eagleton 1990).  This required a fundamental re-
organisation of metaphysics to achieve it.  In place of the Baroque world’s 
elision of being with appearance, Hutcheson explicitly drew a distinction 
between the phenomenal world of experience – which he regarded as a 
lesser mode of apprehension, and the noumenal world – which he 
regarded as the province of true knowledge. He applies this thinking to 
																																																													
26 Doubtless, important consumer goods in the daily life of a country squire.  Hutcheson’s patron was 
the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. 
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the question of beauty, but in a very specific way: is there only one kind 
of Beauty or more than one?  To answer this he falls back on his 
epistemological position.  Beauty, he argues, cannot exist without a 
perceiving mind available to experience it.  In other words, Beauty, in 
some sense is not wholly independent of the mind.  However, that causes 
him a problem because then he wants to explain the cause of such 
perceptions and sensations.  He addresses this by drawing a distinction 
between Original or Absolute Beauty on the one hand, and, Comparative 
or Relative Beauty on the other.  In his discussion of Absolute Beauty he 
immediately rules out the idea that Beauty is an innate property of 
objects.  Instead, he argues for Beauty as the perception of abstract 
qualities such as Uniformity, Variety, Structure and Order, qualities that in 
his metaphysics are not innate in objects but express abstract, even 
mathematical, relationships: 
But what we call Beautiful in Objects, to speak in the mathematical 
style, seems to be in a compound Ratio of Uniformity and Variety: so 
that where the Uniformity of Bodys is equal, the Beauty is as the 
variety; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as the 
Uniformity (ibid, 29). 
 
Relative Beauty by contrast, is Beauty gauged in the comparison of some 
object and that which it copies or represents.  So what we have here are 
then two different orders of Beauty.  The first is a set of mental 
experiences corresponding to abstract qualities associated with objects; 
the second a simple mimetic aesthetic of reproduction. 
That Hutcheson is clearly in the anti-Aristotelian camp can be gauged 
from a number of statements.  He specifically eschews the Aristotelian 
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scheme in the introductory glossary of terms where he specifically denies 
the essentialist or natural ontology of Aristotle by appealing to atomism: 
“The Idea of Substances are compounded of the various simple Ideas 
jointly impress’d, when they presented themselves to our Senses” (ibid, 
20).  Substance is therefore not an explanatory concept but merely a 
summative concept containing a number of simpler, sensory notions.  The 
rejection of Aristotelianism goes further: “…let us take a Metaphysical 
Axiom, such as this, Every Whole is greater than its Part; and we shall 
find no beauty in the Contemplation” (Hutcheson 2004 [1725], 37)27.  It is 
then only a small journey between Hutcheson’s account of the aesthetic 
and his thinking about economic value.  In one of his last works, the 
three-volume The System of Moral Philosophy of 1755, after considering 
such questions as contract and oaths, he turns to the question of the 
source of value28.  He employs an argument that will become central to 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo’s thought: 
The natural ground of all value or price is some sort of use which 
goods afford in life; this is prerequisite to all estimation.  But the 
prices or values in commerce do not at all follow the real use or 
importance of goods for the support, or natural pleasure of life 
(Hutcheson 1755, 53). 
 
																																																													
27 Hutcheson A Synopsis of Metaphysics (1744), was written as a replacement for the Aristotelian text 
of Gerard de Vries, distributed to students and taught by Hutcheson’s own professor John Loudon.  The 
Synopsis is overtly anti-Aristotelian, denying the link in Aristotelian thought between Being and 
Existence: “These words do not mean at all the same thing.  For essence denotes the primary attribute 
of things, such as normally contained in complex ideas, even when there is no object.  The notion of 
existence is always simple, and one which is necessarily suggested to the mind by every sensation as 
well as that by consciousness of itself as existing which accompanies every thought” (Hutcheson 2007 
[1742], 68).  The transition to Lockean empiricism is all but complete. 
28 Note that writers on value with respect to commodities didn’t use the term ‘economic’.  The notion 
that commodities might have a specific sort of value was not generally distinguished from other sorts of 
valuing at this point.   
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Hutcheson’s thoughts on commodity value represent something of a 
halfway house between mercantilism and classical political economy.  He 
acknowledges that usefulness is a pre-requisite to exchange, but then 
goes on to provide a range of possible candidates for the role of substance 
of value.  His ideas are quickly side-tracked into a discussion of money 
and coin and their usefulness and qualities for facilitating exchange.  
However, as the historian of economic thought R.L Meek suggested (Meek 
1973, 34), Hutcheson’s observations that prices (and tellingly “or value”) 
don’t regularly follow “the real use or importance” or “natural pleasure of 
life” suggests that he was actually working towards another concept of 
value that would become central to the work of Bentham and the 
utilitarian school – utility.   
 
(iii) Aesthetic value and utility 
Hutcheson’s specific significance here did not go unnoticed by other 
historians of economic thought. The connection was recognised by Joseph 
Schumpeter in his History of Economic Analysis (1954).  Reviewing the 
specific contribution of what he calls the British moralists of the eighteenth 
century, including Hutcheson, to the development of economic theory, he 
draws a parallel between them and the marginal utility school of Jevons, 
Menger and Walras. It is the beginning of the role of psychological 
explanation in economic, aesthetic and moral behaviour:  
Aesthetical and ethical values were thus explained in a manner 
suggestive of that in which the Italian and French economists in the 
eighteenth century, and the majority of economists of all countries in 
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the nineteenth, explained economic values (Schumpeter 1954, 
127)29. 
 
Schumpeter must have regarded this as a matter of something more than 
suggestive.  The narrowing of aesthetics to a concern with the pleasurable 
sensations produced by art opened the door for a way to think about 
markets: 
In order to exhibit the analogy that interests us, we shall compare 
the objective fact that a work is considered ‘beautiful’ in a given 
social group with the objective fact of market price.  The aesthetic 
theory in question will then be seen to explain the former fact by 
subjective valuations of the members of the group, much as the 
analogous economic theory explains the latter fact by subjective 
valuations of the individuals participating in a market.  In both cases 
subjective valuation creates the objective value (ibid). 
 
It is this ‘subjectivizing’ that Schumpeter regards as important, and, 
through Hutcheson, and then Hume (at least in his rationalist rather than 
sceptical guise), it was transmitted to Bentham30, and then the Mills (pere 
et fils). At this point, Hutcheson and the eighteenth century philosophers 
of art, represent the link between Locke and the utilitarians, and in the 
process codified the aesthetic counterpart to what, as already mentioned, 
the Canadian philosopher CB MacPherson called the “theory of possessive 
individualism” (MacPherson 1962).  Utility and the aesthetic emerge from 
																																																													
29 See also Saisselin (1992) for an account of how notions of the aesthetic and economy related to one 
another in French eighteenth century philosophy. 
30 “The evolution is more marked with Hutcheson, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, the 
foreunner of Hume and the master of Adam Smith.  It is even plausible to conjecture that it was 
through him that Hume and Adam Smith were brought into direct relations with each other.  He 
anticipated Hume in demanding that the Newtonian method should be introduced into morals, and 
Bentham in defining those actions as the most perfectly virtuous which ‘appear to have the most 
universal unlimited Tendency to the greatest and most extensive Happiness’” (Halevy 1972 [1928], 
13). 
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the eighteenth century as two sides of the same coin and set in train a 
distinction with important consequences for both nineteenth and twentieth 
century thought, and which, though surprising, continues to exercise 
thought in the twenty-first century.  However, the eighteenth century also 
considered another candidate with respect to value, that is, labour, and it 
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3. Capitalism, culture and value 
(i) Labour, value and abstraction 
The previous section charted the separation of economic and aesthetic 
value into their mutually excluding but equally mutually conditioning 
opposites.  One of the corollaries of that manoeuvre was that the ground 
of ethics was transferred from the aesthetic to the economic, as utility 
became the simultaneous ground of both economic and ethical value.  
What also happens through this process is that the trans-historic concept 
of labour as the act of human self-making through a metabolic interaction 
with nature (human autopoiesis), acquires a new abstract and 
instrumentalised form.  Locke, Smith and Ricardo contribute seminally to 
its formation only for Marx to come along and reveal that ‘labour’, far from 
being a natural entity was politically constituted in the construction of the 
new routines of market society.   Arguably, the key theoretical innovation 
was completed by Locke when he drew the connections between labour, 
property, value and ethics.  Although often quoted, the relevant passage 
from the Second Treatise of Civil Government is work quoting here in full: 
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, 
yet every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has a 
right to but himself.  The labour of his body and the work of his 
hands we may say are properly his.  Whatsovever, then, he removes 
out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath 
mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his property.  It being by him removed from the 
common state nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something 
annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men.  For this 
labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man 
but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where 
there is enough and as good left in common for others” (Locke 1946, 
15). 
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Aristotle’s notion of ‘art’ or praxis, or even poiesis, as the moving force of 
human individual and social development is transformed into the corner-
stone of modern property relationships.  There is a residual hint of an 
Aristotelian position with respect to sufficiency (“enough and as good 
left”) but labour has become the abstracted substance of modern property 
claims.  Those claims are assessed quantitatively: “The measure of 
property nature has well set by the extent of men’s labour and the 
convenience of life”. (ibid, 18)  It is then only a small jump for Locke, 
preoccupied with codifying the social relationships of market society, to 
state: “For it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on 
everything….”. (ibid, 21)  However, Locke overlooked a key challenge in 
his specification of labour as the substance of value – the problem of 
commensurability.   
 
Smith in the 1760s and Ricardo in the second decade of the nineteenth 
century didn’t solve this either, but their attempts at solutions are 
instructive in terms of the solution that Marx was to develop in the 1850s.  
Both Smith and Ricardo considered the possibility that objects were 
commensurable because they were useful. However, they both rejected 
this on grounds that would have been familiar to Aristotle31.   
																																																													
31 Smith: “The word value, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes exprsses the 
utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the 
possession of that object conveys.  The one may be called “value in use”; the other ”value in 
exchange”” (Smith 2004, 80).  Thereafter going on to offer the standard argument for the asymmetry of 
use-value and exchange-value.  Ricardo offers a more compelling argument.  Rebutting Jean-Baptiste 
Say’s early formulation of utility theory, Ricardo states: “If by an improved machine I can, with the 
same quantity of labour, make two pairs of stockings instead of one, I in no way impair the utility of 
one pair of stockings, though I diminish their value” (Ricardo 1981, 42).  Marx later defended 
Ricardo’s scientific reputation.  Although Ricardo was a founding member of the Political Economy 
Club, his reudiation of utility theory marked him out for early attack which would come in the form of 
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The usefulness of objects is defined by their specific qualities that are, in 
turn, defined by their natures.  Such specificity, by definition, cannot be 
the looked for common property.  They did however propose a solution 
that was not available to Aristotle. They argued that this common 
property of objects was that they were both the products of labour and it 
was this that made them commensurable.  Once that principle was 
established, the second part about measure came easily.  Labour could be 
measured by time.  Hence, what we now call the labour theory of value 
was created.  This was the theoretical insight that allowed the classical 
political economists to arrive at an aggregate value of production that 
could then be divided up according to their various accounts of 
distribution.  We don’t need to worry about those here. However, what is 
important is that after the decline of Ricardian political economy in the 
1830s, the theory of value takes two diametrically opposed but parallel 
paths in the second half of the nineteenth century. One takes us to the 
marginalist revolution, modern economics and the intellectual construction 
of value as ‘utility’, the foundations of which we have already examined, 
and the other takes us to Marx and the critique of political economy, a 
centrepiece of which is his complex wrangling with the problem of value 
and its relationship to capital and wage-labour.  We now need to examine 
these briefly before assessing their significance for the explanation of 
value in contemporary cultural economic imaginaries. 
 
																																																																																																																																																																														
a diatribe by Samuel Bailey (1825) shortly after Ricardo’s death in 1823.  See also Political Economy 
Club (1921) for a summary of debates in the early meetings of the Club and also Rauner (1961) for an 
account of the reception of Bailey’s critique. 
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The first step on the path towards Marx and the critique of political 
economy can be understood by considering why Marx thought the labour 
theory solution would not have been available to Aristotle.  At the heart of 
the labour theory of value is an assumption that labour can not only be 
conceptualised in the abstract, but that it actually has an abstract 
manifestation.  Aristotle’s metaphysics would have struggled with the 
notion of abstract labour in much the same way as he finds it difficult to 
think of useful objects having any kind of relevant commonality32.  As far 
as Aristotle is concerned, things are what they are by nature and cannot 
simply be aggregated homogeneously.  He was also very alert to the 
distinctiveness of different kinds of labour (poesis) that in his thinking 
should be properly distinguished by their ends, the purposes that they can 
realise33.  Smith and Ricardo are also equally certainly alert to the 
challenge represented by the different natures of labouring activities, but 
declare that the reduction can be achieved ‘approximately’.  Marx, who 
was a dedicated scholar of Aristotle, Smith and Ricardo, was not satisfied 
with this account. 
 
Marx finds his solution to the problem by making two seminal intellectual 
leaps.  The first is the distinction he draws between ‘concrete’ and 
‘abstract’ labour. The first relates to those specific kinds of labour – 
fishing, gardening, house-building – that Aristotle would have readily 
																																																													
32 The concept of ‘immaterial labour’ offered in Italian Autonomist Marxism would have made no 
sense whatsoever to Aristotle. 
33 Another potential obstacle to Aristotle considering labour in this way is that labour itself was rarely 
an object of exchange.  Ancient Greek society was a slave-owning society.  Although there were 
instances of independent trade, labour was largely undertaken by slaves rather than by ‘free-men’ paid 
wages (de Ste Croix, 1981) 
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recognised.  The second is the social form of labour under very specific 
historical conditions.  Here we need to make a short digression into Marx’s 
account of history, his social ontology of labour, his thoughts on the 
importance of a surplus in human affairs, and, the particular nature of this 
under capitalism.  The digression will lead us from Marx’s analysis of the 
dual character of labour under capitalism to his second intellectual leap, 
the relationship between abstract labour, wage-labour, value, money and 
capital. 
 
Marx’s historical schema is a work of extraordinary simplicity.  Adopting 
Aristotle’s philosophical essentialism Marx explains that human history can 
be divided according to the forms or essences that a given society takes 
according to how the surplus product is produced and appropriated.  This 
involves making distinctions and divisions.  The first division Marx makes 
is between human history and human pre-history.  Marx makes no bones 
about what is important in the shift from human pre-history to human 
history.  It represents the fullest realisation of the social nature of human-
kind which in turn is intimately bound up with how humans produce and 
reproduce their existence as a species34.  Pre-historical society is 
characterised by the necessity to labour in order to meet the needs 
required for human survival. Capitalism is the final form of pre-history in 
which the natural propensity to labour is usurped by capital, inverted and 
																																																													
34 Norman Geras (1983) amply demonstrates in his review of Marx’s Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach that it 
is perfectly possible, and compatible with Marx’s thought, that human nature might be both essential 
and relational.  In a famous letter of 1868 to his friend Ludwig Kugelmann, Marx explains both sides in 
the following terms: “Every child knows that a nation which ceased to work, I will not say for a year, 
but even for a few weeks would perish….That this necessity of the distribution of social labour in 
definited proportions cannot possibly be done away with by a particular form of social production but 
can only change the mode of its appearance, is self-evident”. (Marx-Engels 1975, 196) 
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returned to labour as the artificial scarcity which compels the specific form 
of wage-labour.  Human history, by contrast is achieved once human 
beings collectively are no longer compelled to labour in order to meet their 
needs but can deploy their labour in direct self-actualisation.  Marx also 
subscribed to the basic proposition that human cooperation is productive 
and at a certain stage begins to produce what in modern terms we would 
call a surplus and humans have to find a means of distributing their effort 
between different activities35.  Marx considered that there were only two 
ways of making this distribution, first according to custom or plan, and 
second, according to the unconscious routines of the market in which the 
relationships between individuals take the form of relationships between 
objects in exchange (Marx 1973, Meikle 1985).  Following this, Marx re-
divides human pre-history between the range of pre-capitalist forms of 
social regulation which involve the direct distribution of social effort, and, 
the capitalist form of regulation where the social effort is distributed by 
the market.  Human history on the other hand, re-introduces custom and 
the plan as humans collectively organise themselves without recourse to 
the market.  Marx’s next theoretical move is to look at the typical kinds of 
social relationship that exist under this tri-partite historical scheme. 
 
																																																													
35 Marx is often described by many commentators as having subscribed to a hybridic moral-natural 
concept of subsistence beyond which supernumery production becomes available for appropriation as a 
surplus.  As is clear from his account of capital, however, ‘surplus’ has to be understood in relation to 
the specific set of social relationships.  In other words there is no recourse to a natural account of 
subsistence or surplus.  Harry W Pearson pulls no punches when he states unambiguously: “…the 
concept of scarcity applied to the economy is a derivative of the market system, and of the 
Enlightenment’s atomistic conception of society…The concept of scarcity will be fruitful only if the 
natural fact of limited means led to a sequence of choices regarding the use of these means, and the 
situation is possible only if there is alternativity to the uses of means and there are preferentially graded 
ends.  But these latter conditions are socially determined…” (Pearson 1957, 320). 
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Pre-capitalist social relationships he describes as relationships of direct 
personal dependence.  Humans are directly dependent on each other and 
their activities.  In the market, by contrast humans enjoy a paradoxical 
freedom from these bonds of personal dependence.  They enjoy personal 
independence from each other, but are dependent on the workings of the 
impersonal market.  Post-capitalist human history, by contrast, is to be 
characterised as a world of free individuality in which the development of 
each individual takes place within a context in which social production is 
subordinated to the collective (See Marx 1973 pp157-159).  His next 
move is to map types of social labour and appropriation of surplus product 
to this scheme. In pre-capitalist society the dominant types of social 
labour are characterised as ‘unfree’. The typical forms in which the surplus 
is appropriated from the direct producers in pre-capitalist society include 
slavery, bonded labour and serfdom and, it is important to point out, the 
surplus is appropriated largely as direct produce, as objects.  It is worth 
noting here, that Marx does not claim that all labour in pre-capitalist 
society is carried out under these conditions.  There is also the possibility 
that some labour is carried out independently by domestic units, largely 
for the purposes of that unit. It is also possible that some types of labour 
might be associated with formally free labourers, for example, the 
journey-man providing a service for a fee. The main point is that the 
dependent forms of slave, bonded and serf labour are the principle means 
by which a surplus is created and appropriated. 
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The social relationships of capitalism however are fundamentally different.  
The surplus in capitalist society is appropriated through the mechanism of 
the market as objects acquire a new dual character as commodities, firstly 
as use-values, and secondly as exchange values.  The question then is 
how do commodities acquire exchange value?  Marx already has an 
answer to this, which he has acquired from Smith and Ricardo.   
Commodities acquire exchange value because labour has been expended 
in their production.  However, here we encounter a problem of which Marx 
was absolutely aware.  Commodities as use-values are the products of 
concrete labour, labour of a specific type and this labour cannot produce 
value.  For products to exist as commodities they must have value which 
is produced by abstract labour.  This is not compatible with concrete 
labour.  At this point we have to confront a duality in Marx’s thinking.  It is 
absolutely true that he subscribed throughout his work to what has now 
become the ‘labour-embodied’ interpretation of the labour theory of value 
in which commodities acquire value by virtue of the labour necessarily 
expended on their production that, in turn, is quantified according to the 
amount of time taken to do this.  However, over the last forty years or so, 
Marx scholarship has challenged this as the only interpretation of Marx36.  
Marx, a case can be made, also subscribed to another theory of value, one 
that was clearly motivated by his doubts about the labour embodied 
theory, and one that appears at various points in his work37.  It is 
especially evident in the first German edition of Capital; he struggles with 
																																																													
36 Seminal contributions arguing for this qualitative interpretation are to be found in: Rubin (1972), 
Pilling, G. (1972), Conference of Socialist Economists (1976), Rosdolsky, (1977), Himmelwit and 
Mohun (1978), Elson (1979), Eldred and Hanlon (1981), Steedman et al (1981) and Fine (1986).  The 
debate has continued in new rounds. 
37 See Meikle (2007) for detail.  
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it explicitly in the French translation of the second edition and again in the 
English translation of the third edition.  However, the accumulated 
evidence of the various editions of Capital (, together with the set of 
notebooks published as the Grundrisse and various shorter notes, 
demonstrates a compelling case for the second theory.  What is important 
about it is that it makes a better account of explaining why wage-labour is 
the social form of supply for surplus producing labour under capitalism, 
something that the labour-embodied theory struggles with.  Just to make 
the point, if value is dependent on labour-embodied, why didn’t capitalism 
simply take over the pre-capitalist forms of un-free labour and continue to 
exploit those to the maximum possible limit?  There has to be an 
important and necessary sense of why wage-labour is the most 
appropriate form of surplus-producing labour under the market 
relationships of capitalist society.  The answer lies in the second theory. 
 
Surplus-value can only be produced in a money economy, where the 
products of labour routinely take the form of commodities and the goal of 
production is not the satisfaction of needs but the accumulation of value. 
Marx makes the argument that the highest form of expression of value is 
capital that is in turn dependent on the category of money.  Money is the 
form of value, the substance of which is abstract labour. How is this 
abstraction brought about?  In capitalist society, labour is not only a 
means of production; it is also a means of acquisition (Dixon and Kay 
1995).  Workers by performing one kind of concrete labour can acquire 
the products of other kinds of concrete labour.  At one and the same time 
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wage – labour ensures that the form of supply of labour is value-
producing and that the abstraction of labour to create the value-substance 
takes place in the capital-wage labour relation mediated by money (the 
form of value).  Aristotle was well aware of the distinction in social affairs 
between the acquisition of money in order to acquire something useful in 
exchange and another type of exchange that is solely motivated by the 
object of acquiring more money as an end in itself.  The former, as 
explained earlier,  he regarded as a rational and proper use of money.  He 
didn’t like the latter because he couldn’t reconcile it with his metaphysics 
that always prioritised purpose over quantity. The idea of pure quantity 
having a legitimate end or goal was alien to him.  However, it is precisely 
this privileging of quantity as an end in itself that is the defining goal of 
capitalism.  Value is the expression of human activity without qualitative 
distinction or identity.  It is human activity rendered null as a product of a 
particular historical form of production.  Once value accumulation 
becomes the goal of production, the various un-free forms of pre-capitalist 
society rapidly become inefficient ways of supplying labour for surplus 
value production.  A pool of market-dependent ‘free’ labour becomes a far 
more efficient source of exploitable labour.  The true meaning of Marx’s 
oft-quoted remarks on the apparently fetishistic nature of the commodity 
is not an early critique of designer branding, but a trenchant critique of 
the kind of economy that places the accumulation of abstract quantity 
over the activity of meeting human needs.  It is then easy to see how 
artistic labour might have come to symbolise free autonomous human 
activity.  One of the consequences of abstraction is that general social 
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labour is rendered devoid of quality by being abstracted in the 
commodity-form38.   
 
It perhaps goes without saying that marginalist economics and its heirs 
today rejected the metaphysics that enabled Marx to construct his 
devastating critique of life under capitalism. As Scott Meikle has 
demonstrated the evolution of that body of ideas called economics was 
instrumental in carrying through what he describes as the ‘metaphysical 
reform’ of nineteenth century anglophone thought.  The new post classical 
political economy instituted quantity as the guiding principle of thought 
and then began to reform the categories of political economy to meet that 
aspiration.  Where the metaphysics of objects allowed Marx to point out 
the alienated and fetishised character of capitalism, the new thinking 
assumed the fetish was the reality and re-constructed the categories 
appropriately.  The most complete expression of this reform was in the 
category of value itself.  Whereas in political economy and Marx, the 
category of value was pivotal, the new metaphysics abolished the 
specificity of objects and their purposes (now called ‘goods’) and displaced 
ends or goals or meaning from the world of objects and the roles they 
play in human intercourse to the realm of the subjective39.  This new 
subjective concept of value, they intellectually borrowed from the 
																																																													
38 It then becomes easy to see how Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique in Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(1997) came to have such critical force, as it is precisely this hope of untrammelled labour that 
becomes the driving for of the culture industry. 
39 This transformation didn’t just occur in economics.  Lacan also saw this metaphysical reform as 
pivotal: “Since Aristotle’s time…we have experienced a complete reversal of point of view…[The] 
theory of values allows us to say that the value of a thing is its desirability” (Lacan 1992, 13-14).  What 
Lacan doesn’t acknowledge is that this re-location of value from object to subject was the product of 
the ideological adaptation of thought to capitalist conditions of exploitation which led to the wholesale 
revision of the basic categories of critical thought. See Kordela (2007).  
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utilitarian philosophers and called it ‘utility’.  Thereafter, the concept of 
value as any sort of critical concept radically falls from view, not just in 
economic theory, but also other varieties of critical thought that then 
become hostage to varieties of relativism and pragmatism.  The concept 
of ‘utility’ is the economic analogue of Bernstein’s mourning aesthetic.  
Deprived of ends, art and culture can only claim value as means, but as 
means, they can never speak on their own behalf.  This dual manoeuvre 
of first denying the metaphysics of essences and then re-locating meaning 
into the one-dimensional world of instrumental subjectivity completes one 
of the most radical shifts in human thought.   
 
An important corollary of this metaphysical double-shift is that the 
concept of labour is also put through the metaphysical reform mill.  Smith, 
Ricardo and Marx all subscribed to the view that the rational concept of 
labour requires a philosophical conception of how humans relate to, 
distinguish themselves from and adapt with their environments.  Over 
millennia, the human race has found ways of being able simultaneously to 
place itself within the natural environment and to distinguish itself from it. 
The acts of working on and through nature Marx described as a metabolic 
interaction.  In another context he describes this metabolic labour as the 
“living form-giving fire” (Marx 1973, 361, cf. Gulli 2005, 17-49).  To which 
we might add that over time humans developed the capacities of speech, 
language and pattern making and recognition – the apparatus for 
recording, expressing and exchanging cognition (Woolf 1982; Roberts 
2007).  Marx’s use of the term ‘labour’ in this context is radically different 
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from how he uses when he talks about specific forms of labour, for 
example wage-labour.  As Gulli (2005) argues, labour goes to the heart of 
the species ontology of humankind. It is, quite literally, what makes 
humans human. 
 
(ii) Culture, ethics and labour 
At this point we need to turn to the relationship between value and the 
aesthetic, but now within the context of contemporary developments in 
the economies of cultural production and consumption.  As indicated 
earlier in section 1(ii), Adorno’s nightmare vision of an acculturated 
economy has become both a reality, and, dynamically, a source of 
economic alternatives.  Whilst it would be a straightforward enterprise to 
locate the various cultural and creative imaginaries of the last twenty 
years or so within the realms of neo-liberalised late capitalism, the 
conspicuous presence of embodied forms of social production in their 
midst challenges this simple ascription.  John Roberts explains the dual 
character of these developments, and their implications fo how we might 
think about cultural economy in the following terms: 
All labour is embedded culturally at some level, but the new 
economy’s enculturation of labour provides something qualitatively 
different from shared class interests and compensatory use-values: a 
real space of autonomous exchange within the heteronomy of the 
workplace.  And, of course, this represents the key transfigurative 
claim of recent writing on immaterial labour derived from the 
autonomist political tradition, to which much of the work on the new 
cultural economy is so clearly indebted.  It is the convergence of the 
structural co-operative power of workers with the immaterial realities 
of the new workplace that has, it is claimed, expanded worker’s 
autonomy, weakening the disciplinary regime of surplus-value 
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extraction.  But is this actually autonomy? Is it generalizable? And 
does it represent an actual weakening of the disciplinary regime of 
extraction? (Robert 2007, 202) 
 
Roberts doesn’t answer his questions, but they hint provocatively at the 
potential which the confluence of general social technique and artistic 
labour offers40.  Three structural changes in the organisation of late 
capitalism point towards such potential: firstly, the reconstruction of 
labour as immaterial labour (the homogenisation of labour around the 
general capacities of coordination and assembly); the progressive 
elimination of value-creating labour from the production process, and 
thirdly, the re-discovery of the body as the locus of labour.  Each sits at 
the heart of a paradox.  Whilst the commodity-form rests on a division of 
labour which ostensibly provides its rationale, capital is driven to eliminate 
the very division of labour which is the ground of its own value.  It does 
this by expelling the particularites of labour (“concrete labour”) from the 
production process (automisation, informatisation, ‘Big Data’ strategies) 
but at the expense of conceding cooperation and coordination to labour in 
the abstract.  In short, abstraction is ultimately compelled to consume 
itself, leaving the particularities of labour outside the routines of capital 
accumulation.  This raises a fundamental question.  If concrete labour is 
no longer organised by capital, then what social form does it take? 
 
																																																													
40 Needless to say, but such forms of labour are also arguably some of the most precarious, although 
without some adequate definition of what secure, good work looks like, precarity can become 
something of a statement of the obvious. 
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There are two over-lapping possibilities – both of which are older than 
capitalism, but which take new forms in the twenty-first century.  These 
are social production and the petty commodity economy. For Marx, social 
production includes forms of production in which the producers directly 
control and appropriate the product without the intervention of the 
market, that is, without the product ever becoming a commodity.  The 
organisation of such an economy can only take place according to custom 
or a plan.  Since there are limited public planning organs in modern 
capitalism, the emergence of forms of social cultural production 
(cooperative, collaborative, inter-disciplinary, community, participatory, 
co-creative, and so forth) suggests the emergence of new “customs in 
common” (Thompson 1991).  Arvidsson and his colleagues describe this 
as an ethical economy in which transactions are made, not according to 
the abstraction of labour, but according to new forms of customary 
distributive right and due based on an extending range of “orders of 
worth” (Arvidsson and Peitersen 2013, 5).  Common orders include 
sustainability, environmental protection, social responsibility and so forth.  
The growth of cooperation and collaboration in particular, encourage 
personal and social orientations towards systems of valuation which 
“value” such properties.  The ethical is played back into the regime of 
social coordination.  Arguably, this is most conspicuous in the local and 
global circuits of petty cultural commodity production, especially those 
mediated by digital technologies. 
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The significance and extent of such activities should not be under-
estimated. In an elegant riposte to both neo-liberal celebrants of 
commodification and their pessimistic antagonists, Colin C. Williams 
(2005) carefully explains that the empirical evidence far from supports the 
commodification thesis.  Re-iterating the ‘limits to capital’ narrative of 
advocates of Marx such as David Harvey and Ray Hudson, Williams 
contests the claim that commodification is inevitably universal. 
Commodification is not a self-propelling force.  It exists as the necessary 
form through which surplus value is produced and appropriated.  In Marx’s 
explanation the two are essentially related phenomena.  There is no 
independent logic of commodification outside of surplus value production 
and appropriation.  The spread of commodification therefore depends on 
the availability of activities suitable for exploitation at the rate expected 
by capital.  There is a whole range of socially necessary activities which 
simply do not provide such opportunities and are therefore either wholly 
untouched by commodification, or, become commodified by capital only at 
the margins, usually opportunistically and for the most part temporarily41. 
Reviewing the research on various types of non-market working activity, 
Williams points out that as much time is spent in Britain on ‘subsistence 
work’ (i.e., non-market household work) as on paid work; that around 10-
12% of economic activity in advanced capitalist countries is actually non-
monetized, and that as much as 10% of monetized exchange activities are 
conducted on a not-for-profit basis.  Social production not only continues 
																																																													
41 One only has to consider the damage done to social production by the opportunistic and marginal 
commodification of health care or education, with the inevitable wasteful investment of social 
resources needed to fix things after capital has made a mess of them. 
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42 Williams (2005) challenges the observation made by neo-liberal advocates and critics alike that to 
the extent that social production does still continue to exist, it can only do so as a residual social 
practice of a pre-capitalist age.  In a ground-breaking study the sociologist Margaret Archer 
demonstrates how the intensifying ‘contextual discontinuity’ of modernity places evermore pressure on 
individuals to mobilise deliberative reflexivity on their everyday choices.  Social production for many 
people is a perfectly rational assessment of projects against chances of success trammelled by objective 
constraints (Archer 2007).  Though outside the scope of this review, the signifiance of regarding 
household work as social production, places a social value on work that is still disproportionately 
undertaken by women. 
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4. Conclusion: A concept too many? 
The resurgence of social and petty commodity production, typified by a range of 
cultural economic imaginaries, reconnects the aesthetic both with its ethical 
ground and with the concrete particularity of labour, thus dissolving the 
distinction between autonomy and heteronomy that has dogged the history of 
aesthetics since the eighteenth century.  Cultural value, insofar as it attempts to 
reconcile aesthetic specificity with the law of value, will always come off the loser 
in that encounter.  It is only by stepping outside that law, that it becomes 
possible to see how the aesthetic and the ethical can be re-grounded in the 
concrete particularity of labour as the locus of human agency and self-making.  
That capitalism itself creates the conditions for the return of particularity is 
perhaps not too surprising.  As the law of value spirals out of control into the 
vertiginous simulacrum of financialisation, the necessity of creating personal and 
social reference points becomes ever more urgent. 
 
In 1930 the economist John Maynard Keynes playfully speculated on life in 2030 
(Keynes 1931).  Released from all but the minimum necessary labour by science 
and socially distributed accumulation, people would be liberated to pass their time 
in individual and collective development – principally through education and 
culture.  Keynes wrote at a time when both culture and economy were open to 
fierce contention.  That healthy contention has continued in the realm of culture.  
With only sixteen years to go we now need to apply the same resources of 
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The Cultural Value Project seeks to make a major contribution to how we think about 
the value of arts and culture to individuals and to society. The project will establish a 
framework that will advance the way in which we talk about the value of cultural 
engagement and the methods by which we evaluate it. The framework will, on the 
one hand, be an examination of the cultural experience itself, its impact on individuals 
and its benefit to society; and on the other, articulate a set of evaluative approaches 
and methodologies appropriate to the different ways in which cultural value is 
manifested. This means that qualitative methodologies and case studies will sit 
alongside qualitative approaches. 
